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.JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 78-2-2 (3)(j).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues for Review:
I.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO VACATE WAS UNTIMELY?
A.

II.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING IMPLICITLY THAT UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60 (b)(6) DID NOT RENDER
DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO RELIEF?
1.

WAS DEFENDANT SERIOUSLY DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS
BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL?

2.

WAS DEFENDANT DEPRIVED OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL?

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT DID
NOT ACT DILIGENTLY?

Standard of Review
There is no dispute on the facts of this case because only Defendant presented
evidence to the trial court for the purposes of Defendant's Motion to Vacate, which
evidence was in the form of various Affidavits; Plaintiffs counsel submitted to evidence
whatsoever. Also, although not required, as to Issue Numbers I. A. 1., III., and IV above,
Plaintiffs counsel did not even oppose (arguments or law) Defendant's counsel's
presentation thereof in relation to Defendant's Motion to Vacate. AH of these issues were
presented to the trial court as part of Defendant's Motion to Vacate and as such were
1

preserved for this appeal. Therefore, this Court of Appeals is reviewing solely issues of
law to determine if the trial court incorrectly applied the undisputed facts to the applicable
laws and rules. The Standard of Review for all issues on this appeal is therefore one of
correctness of error because only questions of law are here for review.

Lincoln Benefit

Life Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern Properties (1992) 838 P. 2d 672, 674;
Hartford Leasing Corporation v. State (1994) 888 P.2d 694, 697.

No particular

deference is given to the trial court under the correctness standard. Lincoln Benefit Life
Insurance Company, supra at 674.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
CASES
Bish's Sheet Metal Company v. Luras (1961) 359 P. 2d 21, 22, 11 Utah 2d 357
Interstate Excavating v. AGLA Development (1980) 611 P. 2d 369, 371
Stewart v. Sullivan (1973) 506 P. 2d 74, 76; 29 Utah 2d 156
Workman v. Nagle Const.. Inc. (1990) 802 P. 2d 749, 751
RULES
Rule 4-506 (3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 58A (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60 (b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-51-36
2

OTHER AUTHORITIES
United States Constitution. Amendment V
United States Constitution. Amendment XIV, Section 1
Utah State Constitution. Article L Section 7
NATURE OF THE CASE. PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL
Over ten (10) years ago in December 1988, Defendant's name was forged on an
Equipment Lease for an unrelated restaurant unbenownst to Defendant.

Then, in

February 1997, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant claiming money due
under such Equipment Lease. Defendant's counsel filed an Answer upon service of the
Complaint. After subsequent counsel of Defendant withdrew, Plaintiffs counsel almost
immediately filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs counsel failed to serve
on Defendant proper notice of the Notice to Appoint Counsel, Motion for Summary
Judgment, Order Granting Summary Judgment filed on April 14, 1998, and the Amended
Order Granting Summary Judgment filed on May 7, 1998 (hereinafter "Motion to
Vacate"). The trial court had, based on such Orders, granted a money judgment in favor
of Plaintiff in the principal sum of $21,915.54 exclusive of court costs, interest, and
attorney's fees.
Defendant's first notice of the judgment entered against him was upon receipt of
a Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings August 28, 1998, after which time
Defendant promptly retained current counsel. Shortly after Defendant's current counsel
investigated the facts, reviewed the evidence, and researched law relevant to these events,
3

and on November 17, 1998, Defendant's current counsel filed on Defendant's behalf a
Motion for Order Vacating and Setting Aside the Orders for Summary Judgment.
The trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Vacate by final Order entered on
January 22, 1999. A final [Amended] Order was entered on February 1, 1999, denying
the Motion to Vacate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 28, 1988, more than eight (8) years before Plaintiff/Appellee
Federal Financial Company (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed the instant lawsuit, the signature
of Defendant/Appellant, Manuel T. Armenta (hereinafter "Defendant") was wrongfully
forged on an alleged Equipment Lease and Guaranty document (hereinafter collectively
"Equipment Lease"). [R. 177-179, 247 ff 4, 5, 248 1 5] Defendant was unaware of
the forgery until the instant lawsuit was filed. [R. 231 f 21, 232 f 21, 248 1 5] The
Equipment Lease was for a restaurant known as Guadalahara Grill 175 West 200 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant never had any connection with such restaurant in terms
of ownership, operation, or otherwise. [R. 247 f 3, 231 f 21, 232 f 21]
On February 6, 1997, more than eight (8) years after the forgery. Plaintiff filed
the instant action against Defendant claiming money due under the Equipment Lease.
Plaintiffs counsel knew at all times of Defendant's home and work addresses
at which process and notices could be served on Defendant. For example, Plaintiffs
counsel caused Defendant to be served with process in this action by personal service at
Defendant's home located at 1116 W. 285 S., Orem, Utah (hereinafter "Defendant's
4

Home Address"). [R. 227 f 5, 32-35] Also, after Defendant's first attorney, Silvia Pena
Chacon, withdrew as counsel, Plaintiffs counsel served a Notice to Appoint Counsel on
Defendant at Defendant's work address of Defendant's restaurant, Mi Ranchito, located
at 2747 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter "Defendant's Business
Address"). [R. 228 f 8, 145-146]
Defendant took prompt actions to defend himself each time he was served with
proper notice of proceedings in this lawsuit. First, Defendant hired Attorney Chacon
to file an Answer to the Complaint alleging, inter alia, the meritorious defenses that the
signature on the Equipment Lease purporting to be that of Defendant was actually a
forgery (fraud), and that the statute of limitations (6 year statute) had run on Plaintiffs
claims. [R. 227 f 5, 130-131] Then, after Attorney Chacon withdrew as Defendant's
counsel, Defendant hired Steven Russell. [R. 228 f f 7, 9]
Then, on January 12, 1998, Attorney Russell filed a withdrawal of counsel, leaving
Defendant without benefit of retained counsel. Also, Attorney Russell never served
Defendant with notice of such withdrawal at either Defendant's Home Address or
Defendant's Business Address, even though Attorney Russell knew of such addresses the
same as did Plaintiffs counsel. Such addresses were a matter of record with the court.
[R. 166-167]
Meanwhile, knowing that Defendant was then without counsel and before
Defendant even knew that Attorney Russell had withdrawn as Defendant's counsel,
Plaintiffs counsel failed to serve on Defendant a Notice to Appoint Counsel at either of
5

Defendant's known addresses. Plaintiffs counsel filed such Notice with the court on
January 20, 1998. [R. 145-146, 229 f 12]

In addition, Plaintiffs counsel quickly

proceeded to file a Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant on January 29,
1998, only nine (9) days after Plaintiffs counsel filed (not served) a Notice to Appoint
Counsel with the trial court. [R. 229 f 13, 82-86] Plaintiffs counsel easily obtained an
order for summary judgment [R. 172-173, 96-97, 102-104] since Defendant was never
served with notice of such motion.
Also, Plaintiffs counsel failed to serve Notice of Entry of Judgment on Defendant
at Defendant's Home Address or Defendant's Business Address [R. 98-99, 170-171],
despite knowing that both were accurate addresses at which to properly apprise Defendant
of proceedings in this lawsuit.
Then, Plaintiffs counsel waited until the three (3) months' period for filing a
motion to vacate under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(1) had expired before
making attempts to collect on the judgment obtained against Defendant.

Obviously,

Defendant had no opportunity to take actions to vacate the judgment because Defendant
had never been served with notice of such judgment during such three (3) month period,
and had no benefit of retained counsel.
On August 28, 1998, almost five (5) months after entry of the Order Granting
Summary Judgment filed April 14, 1998 and almost four (4) months after entry of the
Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment filed May 7, 1998, Plaintiffs counsel
commenced collection on the Judgment.

On such date, Plaintiffs counsel further
6

demonstrated his full knowledge of where to provide proper notice to Defendant by
causing Defendant to be served by personal service at Defendant's Home Address with
a Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings. [R. 230 f 16, 174-176]
Upon receiving such notice of the Supplemental Proceedings at Defendant's Home
Address, Defendant acted promptly to protect his interests. Within three (3) weeks after
becoming aware of such Judgment, Defendant diligently hired current counsel to protect
his interests, culminating in the filing of the Motion to Vacate. Such Motion was denied
by the trial court and is now the subject of the instant appeal. [R. 230 f 18, 231 f 19]
Defendant has been the victim of fraudulent conduct stemming back more than ten
(10) years unbenownst to him until recently and has been subjected to a serious lack of
due process in the manner in which Plaintiffs counsel has sought to prosecute this lawsuit
against Defendant. Defendant now asks this Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's
ruling denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate the judgment and amended judgment
entered against Defendant [R. 301-306] because such relief is the only way to avoid a
substantial miscarriage of justice to an innocent and diligent party, Defendant.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs counsel violated the mandatory provisions of three (3) significant Utah
laws and rules as follows: (1) Rule 58A (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that the prevailing party "shall" promptly give notice of the entry of judgment
to all parties; (2) Rule 4-506 (3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides
that Plaintiffs counsel "must" serve a Notice to Appoint Counsel on Defendant before
7

initiating further proceedings and "no further proceedings shall be held in the matter
until 20 days elapsed from the filing date of such Notice"; and (3) Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-51-36 which provides that Plaintiffs counsel was "required" to
serve on Defendant written Notice to Appoint Counsel before any further proceedings
were had against Defendant. As a direct result of such violations by Plaintiffs counsel,
Defendant was prevented from learning of the Motion for Summary Judgment and Orders
entered thereon.
The aforementioned violations by Plaintiffs counsel deprived Defendant of his due
process rights encompassed in the above-cited law and rules as further protected by the
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, as applied to Utah State via
United States Constitution, Amendment V, and Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section
7. As a direct result of such violations by Plaintiffs counsel, Defendant did not receive
actual notice of such actions taken against Defendant until August 1998, until more than
three (3) months after entry of judgment which prevented filing a motion to vacate under
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(1).

Where Defendant thereupon acted

promptly and diligently to hire current counsel to file the subject Motion to Vacate, the
trial court erred in ruling that Defendant did not file such Motion to Vacate timely within
the provisions of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6).
As a separate and independent argument, Defendant contends that the conduct and
omissions of his prior counsel were so grossly negligent as to render Defendant without
effective assistance of counsel-i.e., no counsel at all. Such conduct and omissions are not
8

"simple" negligence attributable to Defendant and does not thereby cause Defendant's
Motion to Vacate to be classified under "excusable neglect" as set forth in Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(1) which only permits such a motion to vacate within three
(3) months after entry of judgment. Rather, such conduct and omissions by Defendant's
prior counsel demonstrated such extreme incompetency that Defendant was rendered
unable to know of the critical actions being taken by Plaintiffs counsel against Defendant
and to thereby defend against same. As such, Defendant is entitled to set aside the
judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6).
ARGUMENTS
I.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE WAS TIMELY.
The issue presented here is whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that

Defendant's Motion to Vacate was untimely and not meritorious as set forth in the court's
Order. [R. 301-306] Such issue revolves around two (2) primary questions, namely: (1)
Whether Defendant's circumstances fall within the provisions of Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6) which permits a Motion to Vacate to be filed more than three
(3) months after entry of a judgment; and (2) Whether Defendant's circumstances fall
under the category of "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1) of Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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A.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60 (b)(6) RENDERS
DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO RELIEF.
Defendant has been seriously deprived of due process and effective

assistance of counsel which resulted in judgment being entered against Defendant. The
trial court erred in denying Defendant his "day in court" pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6) [formerly Rule 60 (b)(7)].
1.

DEFENDANT WAS SERIOUSLY DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS
BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL.
Lack of due process has been long determined by the Utah Supreme

Court to be a reason justifying relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Bish's Sheet Metal Company v. Luras (1961) 359 P. 2d 21, 22, 11 Utah 2d
357; Interstate Excavating v. AGLA Development (1980) 611 P. 2d 369, 371. Plaintiffs
counsel took advantage of Defendant at the time when Defendant's counsel withdrew as
such.

In order to obtain summary judgment against Defendant, Plaintiffs counsel

violated specific and critical Utah laws put in place for the very purpose of ensuring
substantial due process would be afforded to parties under both the Utah State
Constitution, Article I, Section 7, and the United States Constitution, Amendment V, as
applied to Utah State via United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1.
For example, Defendant's counsel provided the trial court with copies
of the certificates of service demonstrating that Plaintiffs counsel knew from the
inception of this lawsuit forward exactly where to serve notices of proceedings properly
10

on Defendant, namely, at Defendant's Home Address and Defendant's Business Address.
[R. 227 f 5, 32-35] Also, the certificate of service regarding the Motion and Order in
Supplemental Proceedings served on Defendant at Defendant's Home Address long after
the judgment had been entered demonstrates the full knowledge of Plaintiffs counsel of
Defendant's whereabouts at all times. [230 f 18, 231 1 19] These facts were not
disputed by Plaintiffs counsel in his opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate.
Rule 58A (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides clear that
the prevailing party "shall" promptly give notice of the entry of judgment to all parties.
Yet, Plaintiffs counsel chose not to provide proper notice of such judgment to Defendant,
despite this critical law and the clear knowledge of Defendant's specific addresses by
Plaintiffs counsel.

The notice of entry of judgment allegedly served by Plaintiffs

counsel was sent to an address which was never Defendant's address. Again, Plaintiffs
counsel offered no dispute in evidence, argument, or law on this issue.
Workman v. Nagle Const., Inc. (1990) 802 P.2d 749, 751, states:
. . .if a losing party has remained ignorant of a
judgment in part because the prevailing party
has not complied with Rule 58A(d), the
resulting delay is more reasonable for purposes
of Rule 60(b)(5)-(7). . . .while compliance with
those rules [Rule 58A(d) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and Rule 4-504 Utah Code of
Judicial Administration] does not bring about
the automatic invalidity of an entered judgment,
it is a weighty factor in determining the
timeliness of later challenges to the judgment
under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) through (7).
[emphasis added]
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Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts that Defendant's ignorance of the judgment
was primarily as a result of Plaintiffs counsel's violation of the foregoing Rules, then
Defendant's Motion to Vacate should be deemed timely pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6). The trial court seriously erred as a matter
of law in ruling otherwise.
Also, Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern
Properties (1992) 838 P.2d 672, 675, dealt with defendants claiming that their ability to
timely challenge the default judgment was impaired because Plaintiffs counsel failed to
comply with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 58A(d) and Utah Code of Judicial
Administration Rule 4-504. However, in that case, the court found that the defendants
had later received actual notice of the judgment when they were served with a
supplemental proceedings order only seven (7) weeks after the default judgment had been
entered. The court cited Workman, supra, and reviewed the case in terms of using such
failure to comply with the Rules noted above as an important factor in resolving the
timeliness issue. The court then determined that since the defendants had actual notice
of the judgment within the three (3) months period for "excusable neglect" under Rule
60(b)(1) and did not file their motion to vacate during such period, defendants had not
acted timely.
In total contrast to the facts of Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance
Company, supra, Defendant in the instant case did not receive any such actual notice of
the judgment until August 28, 1998, when he was served with a Supplemental
12

Proceedings Order. But receiving such notice on such date was long past the three (3)
months' period after entry of judgment in this case. [R. 172-173, 96-97, 102-104]
Therefore, Defendant had no opportunity whatsoever to take actions to vacate the
judgment within the three month time period of Rule 60(b)(1). Thus, the trial court
erred in ruling that Defendant did not act timely when in fact Defendant was deprived of
the chance to move to vacate the judgment within such three month time period as a
direct result of Plaintiffs counsel violation of the foregoing Rules for notice to be given
to Defendant. As such, under Workman, supra, Defendant is entitled to prevail on this
appeal.
It is critical for this Court to realize that Plaintiffs counsel served
proper notices on Defendant in this action at Defendant's Home Address and Defendant's
Business Address only when doing so would profit Plaintiff, such as in serving process
at the beginning of the lawsuit and then in serving papers regarding collecting on the
judgment wrongfully obtained more than one (1) year later. However, Plaintiffs counsel
knowingly prevented Defendant from learning about the judgment entered against him by
not serving notice to Defendant at either Defendant's Home Address or Defendant's
Business Address of the Notice to Appoint Counsel [R. 168-169, 80-81], Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 82-86], or the notice of entry of judgment [R. 170171, 98-99]. Thus, Defendant suffered a serious lack of due process as a result of the
deliberate or at least grossly negligent conduct of Plaintiff s counsel which violated wellestablished Utah law.

Under such circumstances, the trial court erred in denying
13

Defendant's Motion to Vacate because Defendant is clearly entitled to at least have his
"day in court." In addition, unless Defendant's Motion to Vacate is granted, Plaintiff via
the wrongful conduct of Plaintiff s counsel will have been aided in perpetrating a fraud
upon Defendant.
In addition, Rule 4-506 (3) of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration required Plaintiffs counsel herein to serve a Notice to Appoint Counsel
before initiating further proceedings and then not until 20 days elapsed from the filing
date of such Notice. Plaintiffs counsel never served a copy of such Notice on Defendant
at Defendant's Home Address or Defendant's Business Address. [R. 168-169, 80-81] By
failing to give such notice, Plaintiffs counsel violated such Rule by initiating the "further
proceedings" of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment which resulted in judgment
against Defendant.
And, even had proper notice been given under Rule 4-506(3), which
it was not, Plaintiffs Motion was filed (on January 29, 1998) only nine (9) days after
filing the Notice which further violated the Rule. [R. 82-86]

Such violations by

Plaintiffs counsel further demonstrates that Defendant suffered a substantial lack of due
process. Plaintiffs counsel also failed to even address this issue regarding violations
of Rule 4-506(3) by Plaintiffs counsel in opposing Defendant's Motion to Vacate,
wherein Plaintiffs counsel did not offer any contrary evidence, arguments, or law;
therefore, the facts and law on this issue are undisputed in favor of Defendant. The
default judgment entered from such Motion was improper. It would be extremely unjust
14

to allow Plaintiffs counsel to violate the timing requirements of Utah law which helped
Plaintiff gain an advantage over Defendant who was not represented by counsel and then
not allow Defendant the opportunity to vacate such wrongfully obtained judgment based
on "timeliness" grounds. Thus, the trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to
Vacate. Defendant should be allowed a fair opportunity to defend the case on the merits.
In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiffs counsel violated a companion
Utah statute, namely, Utah Code Annotated Section 78-51-36 which mandates as follows:
When an attorney dies or is removed or
suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to
an action or proceeding for whom he was acting
as attorney must, before any further
proceedings are had against him be required
by the adverse party, by written notice, to
appoint another attorney or to appear in
person, [emphasis added]
This statute clearly confirms the legislative intent behind Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-506(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration which
is to ensure that parties not represented by counsel, such as Defendant in the instant case,
receive the protection of due process requirements before the opposing party initiates
further proceedings in the case. Where Plaintiffs counsel failed to comply with such
mandatory law by filing the Motion for Summary Judgment almost immediately after
attorney Russell's withdrawal notice was filed and without serving a Notice to Appoint
Counsel on Defendant at either of his two (2) well-known addresses, Defendant was
/ / /
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deprived of a fair and adequate opportunity to move to vacate the subject judgment in this
case. As such, Defendant's Motion to Vacate was timely.
In addition, even though it is reasonable to infer from the evidence
presented by Defendant's counsel to the trial court that Plaintiffs counsel knew exactly
where to serve proper notices on Defendant in this action all along, it is important to
point out that injustice to Defendant would still be the result if Plaintiffs counsel's
violations were made inadvertently, as oppposed to knowingly because Plaintiffs counsel
was held to specific statutory duties under Utah law. Where Defendant lost out on a
vital opportunity to defend himself on the merits resulting from Plaintiffs counsel's either
intentional or unintentional conduct, Defendant should be permitted to vacate the
judgment according to the law cited above and the liberal policy of the law as described
below.
Further, Plaintiffs counsel is estopped to argue that Defendant was
not diligent (which is not true), when in fact Plaintiffs counsel himself violated several
specific, mandatory Utah laws and rules which prevented Defendant from discovering the
Motion for Summary Judgment and the judgments obtained thereon by Plaintiffs counsel,
all at the most vulnerable time for Defendant, namely, right after Defendant's prior
counsel withdrew. Plaintiffs counsel was subject to specific statutory duties with which
he failed to comply. According to Workman, supra, and other authorities cited above,
Plaintiffs counsel created the dilemma for Defendant and is therefore estopped from
arguing against reversing the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Vacate. Also,
16

since Plaintiffs counsel has failed to provide any opposition (evidence or authorities)
whatsoever to justify Plaintiffs counsel's failure to comply with his statutory duties,
Plaintiffs counsel, and accordingly Plaintiff, must be held accountable for such wrongful
conduct.

Thus, this Court must reverse the trial court for erring in not granting

Defendant's Motion to Vacate.
2.

DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL.
Plaintiffs counsel mischaracterizes the incompetent conduct of

Defendant's prior counsel as "negligence," when in fact such conduct was clearly
"incompetency of counsel."

Plaintiffs counsel is incorrect in claiming that the

incompetency of counsel of Mr. Russell amounts only to "simple negligence" which
should be imputed to Defendant under basic agency principles alluded to in the case cited
by Plaintiffs counsel of Russell v. Martell (1984) 681 P.2d 1193, 1195.

Rather,

incompetency of counsel or ineffective assistance of counsel illustrated by the fact
scenario of the instant lawsuit consists of conduct and omissions by counsel which are
so lacking in competency as to amount to no assistance of counsel at all. Defendant's
moving papers never used the terms "negligence,"

"inadvertent conduct," or

"misconduct" to describe such actions despite the attempts by Plaintiffs counsel to distort
the content of Defendant's Motion to Vacate. Rather, Defendant's prior counsel, Steven
Russell, unsuccessfully opposed Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery in a seriously
incompetent manner by creating an obviously defective affidavit by Sergio Armenta. Mr.
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Russell also incompetently requested Sergio Armenta to sign in the name of Defendant
(based on a power of attorney document unrelated to this lawsuit) alleged responses to
Plaintiffs First sets of discovery requests. [R. 235-236] However, as a result, Plaintiffs
counsel served a Second set of discovery requests which Mr. Russell never sent to
Defendant. [R. 228 f 10, 229 ff 10-11] It was this Second set of requests upon which
Plaintiffs counsel based its Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant which was
granted. As a direct result of Mr. Russell's severe incompetence, Defendant never got
a fair opportunity to oppose Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, to respond to Plaintiffs first
and second sets of discovery, and to oppose Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion which,
when granted, placed Defendant in his current dilemma.
In a worst case scenario, Mr. Russell should have at least sent
Defendant a copy of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and discovery requests at either of
Defendant's known addresses (no evidence suggests Mr. Russell even tried such method).
Both addresses were clearly a matter of record in the court's file. Then, if he had no
contact from Defendant, Mr. Russell could have filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
and give proper notice to Defendant thereof so that Defendant could have the opportunity
to defend against Plaintiffs claims on the merits. But, in addition to the misconduct of
Plaintiffs counsel, and largely because of Mr. Russell's incompetence, Defendant never
got that chance. Therefore, Mr. Russell's incompetence renders Defendant entitled to
relief from the judgments entered against him pursuant to Rule 60 (b)(6) of the Utah
/ / /
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Rules of Civil Procedure and Stewart v. Sullivan (1973) 506 P.2d 74, 76, 29 Utah 2d
156, cited in Defendant's Motion to Vacate.
The interpretation by Plaintiffs counsel of Stewart in his opposition
to the Motion to Vacate has missed the crux of its holding. Stewart granted relief under
Rule 60 (b)(7) [now Rule 60 (b)(6)! on the grounds that the plaintiffs attorney had failed
to inform plaintiff about the dismissal of plaintiff s case and about subsequent motions,
which Court stated in plain words as follows:
The plaintiff had no knowledge of the dismissal and
subsequent motions made in respect thereto. It was not
until several months after his counsel became
incapacitated to represent him and the plaintiff had
employed other counsel he learned what had
transpired. Id. at 76.
These were the circumstances which warranted the Court in permitting the plaintiff to
seek relief pursuant to Rule 60 (b)(7) [now Rule 60 (b)(6)] where plaintiff did not bring
a motion for such relief until more than one (1) year after the dismissal was entered.
Had such plaintiffs counsel not acted so extremely incompetent, the plaintiff would have
been able to file said motion much earlier.

Plaintiffs reason justifying having the

dismissal be "without prejudice" (i.e., that plaintiffs discovery responses to one
defendant responded to questions which were similar to those by a second defendant) was
only relevant to the issue of defending the previous motion on the merits, not to the Rule
60 (b)(6) issue. As such, Stewart does support Defendant's position herein that
/ / /
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Defendant is entitled to relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) based on "incompetency of
counsel "/"ineffective assistance of counsel".
Even

assuming,

arguendo,

that

Sullivan,

supra,

does

not

unequivocally stand for the proposition that incompetency of counsel is a reason justifying
relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court is respectfully
requested to consider the specific facts of the instant case which will reveal on their own
that they demonstrate that, at least in the instant case, incompetency of counsel exists and
justifies relief to Defendant under Rule 60 (b)(6) which prescribes "any other reason
justifying relief. . . . "
In addition, such serious incompetency of counsel by Mr. Russell can
in no way negate the detrimental effect of Plaintiff s counsel violating Utah statutes and
rules which directly prevented Defendant from having a fair and adequate opportunity to
defend himself on the merits in this action. As such, the trial court decision must be
reversed in favor of Defendant.
3.

CONCLUSION: DEFENDANT WAS TIMELY IN FILING THE
MOTION TO VACATE MORE THAN THREE (3) MONTHS
AFTER ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
In review, and first, Defendant's signature was forged on the

Equipment Lease ten (10) years ago, unbenownst to Defendant.

Secondly, Plaintiffs

counsel files the instant action against Defendant long after the expiration of the statute
of limitations for Plaintiffs claims. Then, Plaintiffs counsel files a Motion for Summary
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Judgment against Defendant almost immediately after Defendant's counsel withdrew and
before Defendant even knew of such withdrawal and with no proper notice of the Motion
or judgment given to Defendant.

Then, Plaintiffs counsel waits until the three (3)

months period for Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(1) expires before making
efforts to collect on the judgment which requires actual notice to Defendant.
Defendant promptly hires new counsel to file the Motion to Vacate.

Then,

Under such

circumstances, due process and substantial justice can only be afforded to Defendant by
reversing the trial court's decision denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate. The trial court
simply failed to properly apply the undisputed facts to the applicable law, namely, Rule
60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In light of the serious lack of due process by Plaintiffs counsel and
ineffective assistance of counsel by Attorney Russell to which Defendant was subjected,
Defendant's circumstances clearly justify the granting of Defendant's Motion to Vacate
under the provisions of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6).
II.

DEFENDANT ACTED DILIGENTLY.
Every time proper notice was given to Defendant in this action, Defendant took

diligent actions to defend himself and protect his rights.

For example, when the

summons and complaint was served on Defendant at Defendant's Home Address,
Defendant hired attorney Silvia Chacon to file an Answer asserting meritorious defenses.
[R. 227 f 5, 130-131, 36-37] Also, when Ms. Chacon sent notice to Defendant of her
withdrawal as counsel, followed up by a Notice to Appoint Counsel by Plaintiffs
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attorney, both notices of which were sent to Defendant's Business Address, Defendant
promptly hired another attorney, Mr. Steven Russell, to defend his interests. [R. 228 ff
7, 9] Then, when Defendant was served with the Plaintiffs Motion for Supplemental
Proceedings on August 28, 1998, Defendant took prompt action to hire current counsel,
to assist such counsel in investigating the events which transpired in this action without
notice to Defendant, and caused the instant Motion to be filed. [R 230 f 18, 239 1f 19]
Also, concurrently with filing the Motion to Vacate, Defendant provided Plaintiffs
counsel with full responses to all sets of discovery requests including the subject Request
for Admissions. [R. 232 f 22, 180-220] Therefore, it was Plaintiffs counsel's failure
to provide adequate and fair notice of critical proceedings herein to Defendant, not any
lack of diligence on Defendant's part, which prevented Defendant from being able to file
the instant Motion sooner to defend against Plaintiffs claims on the merits. As such, the
trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate.
In the opposition paper filed by Plaintiffs counsel to Defendant's Motion to
Vacate, Plaintiffs counsel wrongfully attempted to create facts which do not exist in
efforts to support his conclusory claim that Defendant was not diligent. For example,
nowhere in Defendant's Motion to Vacate [R. 118-128, 226-233] did Defendant state, let
alone "admit," to having not communicated regularly with his attorney. To the contrary,
Defendant did communicate with attorney Chacon and via his son, Sergio Armenta, did
communicate with attorney Russell. The fact that Mr. Russell failed to notify Defendant
at all regarding Defendant's need to take further actions to defend himself goes to Mr.
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Russell's serious incompetency as counsel, not to any lack of diligence on Defendant's
part.

Such incompetency of counsel was so serious and blatant that it cannot be

attributable to Defendant in terms of rendering Defendant not entitled to relief herein.
Also, Plaintiffs counsel contended in bad faith and falsely that Defendant failed to
maintain the correct address for this Court when in fact, as set forth at length in
Defendant's moving papers, Defendant's Home Address and Business Address were at
all times in the Court's file. Such addresses of Defendant in fact were utilized by
Plaintiffs counsel only at times which were convenient to Plaintiffs counsel, such as
when he sought to serve Defendant in this action and when he sought to collect on the
wrongfully obtained judgment against Defendant. As such, Defendant's Motion should
be granted.
In addition, Plaintiffs counsel acted totally out of line and without providing any
evidentiary support whatsoever for his wild claims that Defendant engaged in fraud.
Also, Plaintiffs counsel tried to confuse the court by making Defendant's son, Javier,
who forged Defendant's signature on the Equipment Lease, to be the same as a different
son, Sergio, who was in good faith assisting Defendant in retaining new counsel to defend
against Plaintiffs claims in this lawsuit. [R. 228 f 9, 235-236]
The trial court may only draw "reasonable" inferences from the facts and those
"facts" can only be gleaned from the evidence properly before the court. Based on the
trial court's findings of fact stated in its Order denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate,
it is obvious that the trial court accepted as the "gospel truth" the conclusory statements
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made by Plaintiffs counsel in his opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate. However,
none of such wrongful statements can be supported by any evidence before the court for
such Motion.

Plaintiffs counsel failed to file any affidavits or other forms of

evidence to support his opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate. Therefore, based
solely on the evidence before the trial court which consisted of certain affidavits filed by
Defendant in support of such Motion, the trial court could never draw any reasonable
inferences from such evidence of any wrongdoing or lack of diligence by Defendant or
even his son Sergio. What obviously occurred is that Plaintiffs counsel was successful
in his bad faith efforts to steer the trial court's attention off track to an unsupported set
of accusatory and conclusory statements.

The trial court thus erred seriously to

Defendant's detriment, rendering it necessary to reverse such decision forthwith.
It is critical to point out here that when reviewing whether or not Defendant acted
diligently, the only relevant period of time to review is the short window of time between
when Defendant's attorney withdrew as counsel and the time which is three (3) months
after the court entered judgment against Defendant. In essence, Plaintiffs counsel filed
the Motion for Summary Judgment almost immediately after Defendant's attorney, Mr.
Russell, withdrew as his counsel and before Defendant ever became aware of such
withdrawal. Defendant clearly had no opportunity to take actions to defend himself under
these circumstances. Defendant's fate was decided during a very short period of time
when Defendant as a "lay person" was most vulnerable. Also, because of the wrongful
conduct of Plaintiffs counsel, Defendant did not receive actual notice of the judgment
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until August 28, 1998, when Plaintiffs counsel caused him to be served with the
Supplemental Proceedings Order. Within three (3) weeks thereafter, Defendant had hired
current counsel to take actions to vacate such judgment and spoke to other counsel prior
to that time which helped Defendant locate current counsel. Such conduct demonstrates
that Defendant acted diligently in pursuing the vacating of the judgments herein.
Also, it is important to focus on the fact that it is Plaintiffs burden of moving the
case along where Defendant only filed an Answer to the Complaint and no Counterclaim.
As such, where Defendant is simply a "lay person", unlike an experienced litigation
attorney who is continuously aware of pending deadlines and affirmative actions to be
taken, Defendant acted reasonable in assuming that whenever Plaintiffs counsel took his
next move to proceed with the action, then Defendant would receive proper notice thereof
so that Defendant would know to take actions to defend himself. However, as a direct
result of Plaintiffs counsel proceeded immediately to file a Motion for Summary
Judgment in violation of well-established Utah law and rules, and to fail to give
Defendant proper notices, Defendant was unable to protect his interests. Nonetheless,
when Defendant was apprised of the Supplemental Proceedings Order, Defendant
responded promptly herein. As such, Defendant acted diligently in this matter. The trial
court's decision must be reversed.
The trial court's Order to the effect that Defendant bears the sole responsibility for
knowing about all proceedings pending in the lawsuit is a far reaching overstatement of
basic duties of a defendant in any civil litigation. [R. 301-303] What the trial court has
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done is to ignore all of the wrongful conduct of Plaintiffs counsel, intentional or
unintentional (either one of which seriously deprived Defendant of due process), and to
instead deem Defendant 100 % responsible to suffer all consequences of default
judgments rendered against him. In addition, the court has overlooked the fact that
Defendant is a "lay person" who was not represented by counsel at the time that
Plaintiffs counsel sought to take such critical actions to obtain the wrongful judgment
against Defendant. Such a statement in the trial court's Order is entirely contrary to the
specific legislative mandate encompassed in Rule 60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the liberality of Utah public policy in avoiding forfeiture of the opportunity
for Defendant to have a trial on the merits. As such, the trial court's decision must be
reversed.
Defendant is entitled to an opportunity to defend itself on the merits of the instant
action. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly supported this proposition as follows:
The uniformally acknowledged policy of the law is to accord litigants the
opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where that can be done without serious
injustice to the other party. To that end, the courts are generally indulgent toward
the setting aside of default judgments where there is a reasonable justification or
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and where timely application is made
to set it aside. Consistent with the objective just stated, where there is doubt
about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of doing so, to the end that each party may have an opportunity to
present his side of the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance
with law and justice, [emphasis added] Interstate Excavating, supra at 371.
Defendant has demonstrated many reasonable justifications exist for vacating the default
judgment and that Defendant acted timely and diligently in filing this Motion.
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All

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the undisputed facts of the instant case
should be viewed in a light favorable to allowing Defendant a fair opportunity to have a
trial on the merits. Therefore, this Court should grant Defendant that opportunity.
III.

PLAINTIFF WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED BY REVERSING THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION.
Plaintiffs counsel had a serious set of duties to comply with under Utah law and

rules cited above which provide further guarantees to Defendant's constitutional rights to
due process under the Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7, and the United States
Constitution, Amendment V, as applied to Utah State via United States Constitution,
Amendment XIV, Section 1. The facts are undisputed which demonstrate that Plaintiffs
counsel clearly violated such law and rules. The direct effect of such violations by
Plaintiffs counsel is that Defendant was not served with proper notice of the Notice to
Appoint Counsel, the Motion for Summary Judgment, and the resulting orders for
summary judgment thereon in time for Defendant to have a fair and adequate opportunity
to move to vacate such judgment within the three (3) month window permitted under Rule
60 (b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under RusselL supra at 1195, the wrongful conduct by Plaintiffs counsel is
attributable to Plaintiff.

Thus, Plaintiff, as a result of the wrongful conduct and

omissions by Plaintiffs counsel, must suffer the consequences of causing such a serious
deprivation of the constitutional and statutory rights of Defendant to have proper notice
of such critical proceedings in this lawsuit.
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Defendant should not suffer any such

consequences. As such, since Plaintiffs counsel created Defendant's plight. Plaintiff
would in no manner whatsoever be prejudiced by this Court reversing the trial court's
decision denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate,
IV.

DEFENDANT PRESENTED MERITORIOUS DEFENSES.
This issue must be resolved in favor of Defendant since Plaintiffs counsel did not

argue or otherwise dispute the meritorious defenses presented by Defendant in his
Motion to Vacate. Also, even though the trial court's Order stated that Defendant's
Motion to Vacate was not meritorious which is the subject of this appeal, the trial court's
Order did not say that Defendant's "meritorious defenses" were not meritorious. [R. 301306] It is therefore undisputed that Defendant has presented meritorious defenses. Also,
the defenses presented by Defendant as such, namely, statute of limitations and fraud
(forgery), stand by themselves as sufficient, each one alone, to entirely render Defendant
entitled to prevail on the merits against Plaintiff. [R. 130-131] As such, Defendant has
demonstrated that there are substantial reasons making it wholly worthwhile in reversing
the trial court's decision and in thereby permitting Defendant to have a trial on the
merits.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing discussion, and after reviewing the issues on this appeal
under the rule of correctness, it is clear that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's
Motion to Vacate. Defendant was deprived of the statutory and constitutional protections
customarily afforded and Defendant acted diligently in pursuing the vacating of the
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subject judgment. Defendant would have acted sooner but for the serious violations of
Utah law and rules by Plaintiffs counsel which prevented Defendant from learning of the
judgment. Thus, this Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's ruling which
denied Defendant's Motion to Vacate and thereby permit Defendant to have a fair and
adequate opportunity to defend this case on the merits.
Dated: May 10, 1999

LAW OFFICES OF MONTIVEL A. BURKE, II
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BY:

Moptivel A. Burke, II
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
Manuel T. Armenta

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - BY MAIL
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document described as BRIEF BY APPELLANT by mail, postage prepaid, to the
following, on the date of

May 10

, 1999.

Bryan W. Cannon, Esq.
Aspen Plaza
871 E. 9400 S.
Sandy, UT 84094
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Bryan W.Cannon, #0561
John R. Riley, #2758
Attorney for Plaintiff
Aspen Plaza
871 East 9400 South
Sandy, Utah 84094
Telephone: (801)255-7475

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
FEDERAL FINANCIAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
1
vs.

ORDER

]

MI RANCHITA d/b/a GUADALAHARA
GRILL and MANUEL T. ARMENTA as
guarantor,

;
]
]1

Civil No. 970900898

Defendants.

]1

JUDGE HENRIOD

The Motion by Defendant Manuel T. Armenta for Order Vacating and Setting Aside
Order Granting Summary Judgment and Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment came
before the court pursuant to Rule 4-501, UCJA. The court, having received the memoranda of
the parties, and the Affidavit of Manuel T. Armenta, and having reviewed the pleadings on file,
now enters the following ruling, findings and order on said Motion:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I.

The court finds that the Defendant is responsible for failing to remain in contact

CK

with his attorney who was representing him through the Motion for Summary
Judgment in this case.
2.

The court finds that the facts advanced by the Defendant in support of his Motion
to Set Aside are matters that were within the control of the Defendant for which
the Defendant bears the sole responsibility in terms of his lack of knowledge of
what was going on in this case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

1.

The Defendants' Motion for Order Vacating and Setting Aside Order Granting
Summary Judgment and Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment are
denied.

DATED this

%

day of January, 1999.

BY THE COURT:

Steven L. Henriod, District Court Judg<

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOTICE
Please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for Plaintiff, Bryan W. Cannon, will
submit the above and foregoing Order to the court for signature, upon the expiration of five (5)
days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days from mailing, unless written objection is
filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504, UCJA. I certify that I served a copy of this
proposed order and Notice on Montivel A. Burke II, Attorney for Defendant Manuel T. Armenta,
360 West 550 South, Orem, Utah 84058, this
first class mail.
DATED this

/ ^ c l a y of January, 1999, postage prepaid via

>^
I ^

day of January, 1999.

&U^__

Bryan W.Cannon,#0561
John R. Riley, #2758
Attorney for Plaintiff
Aspen Plaza
871 East 9400 South
Sandy, Utah 84094
Telephone: (801)255-7475

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
FEDERAL FINANCIAL COMPANY,

]

Plaintiff,

;
!
]

vs.

ORDER

MI RANCHITA d/b/a GUADALAHARA
GRILL and MANUEL T. ARMENTA as
guarantor,

j
]
]1

Civil No. 970900898

Defendants.

]1

JUDGE HENRIOD

The Motion by Defendant Manuel T. Armenta for Order Vacating and Setting Aside
Order Granting Summary Judgment and Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment came
before the court pursuant to Rule 4-501, UCJA. The court, having received the memoranda of
the parties, and the Affidavit of Manuel T. Armenta, and having reviewed the pleadings on file,
now enters the following ruling, findings and order on said Motion:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the Defendant's Motion was filed out of the time period in
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which the Motion had to be filed and the Motion is not meritorious.
2.

The Court finds Defendants' Motion to set aside is untimely.

3.

The court finds that the Defendant is responsible for failing to remain in contact
with his attorney who was representing him through the Motion for Summary
Judgment in this case.

4.

The court finds that most of the reasons advanced by the Defendant in support of
his Motion to Set Aside are matters that were within the control of the Defendant
for which the Defendant bears the sole responsibility in terms of his lack of
knowledge of what was going on in this case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

1.

The Defendants' Motion for Order Vacating and Setting Aside Order Granting
Summary Judgment and Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment are
denied.

DATED this

/

day ofJanoaTy, 1999.

BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOTICE
Please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for Plaintiff, Bryan W. Cannon, will
submit the above and foregoing amended proposed Order to the court for signature, upon the
expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days from mailing, unless
written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504, UCJA. I certify that I served
a copy of this amended proposed order and Notice on Monti vel A. Burke II, Attorney fo*
Defendant Manuel T. Armenta, 360 West 550 South, Orem, Utah 84058, this ^
January, 1999, postage prepaid via first class mail.
DATED t h i s P ^ 3

day of January, 1999.

~~~day of
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11 risihiM :\Tu
BISH'S SHEET METAL COMPANY, a
Utah corporation. Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Chris J. LURAS. d/b/a Liberty Bell Bakery
Company. Defendant and Appellant.
No. 9309.
Supremo Court of Utah.

court on an appeal without due notice of
such appeal or the proceeding in the district court to the party prevailing in the
city court such a showing would t*tahh*di
a lack of due process of law and the aggrieved party would he entitled to relief
from the judgment of the district court
even after the expiration of three m o n t h s
because relief from a judgment on account
Rub>_

Feb. 3. 1001
Civil action. From a judgment of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Ray Van Cott, Jr., J., the defendant appealed. T h e Supreme Court, Wade, C. J.,
held that where notice of appeal was filed
a f u r the entry of judgment, the fact that
service was made he fore such entry did
not affect the jurisdiction of the district
court on appeal from the city court to try
the case.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error
C=>338(l). 370, 395, 428(1), 430(1)
Under the rules, an appeal must be
taken within one month after notice of
entry of judgment, and appellant must
serve and file a notice of appeal upon the
adverse party, and such filing and the payment of fees therefor within the time
allowed are the only requirements necessary tor the court to have jurisdiction, but
any failure to follow the rules makes the
appellant subject to appropriate action by
the court including dismissal of the appeal.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 73(h, I).
2. Courts C=>I90(4)
Where notice of appeal was filed after
the entry of judgment, the fact that service
was made before such entry did not affect
the jurisdiction of the district court on
appeal from the city court to try. the case
but merely subjected the respondent to a
dismissal of the appeal or other action in
*he discretion of the court. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 73ih, / ) .

Civil Procedure, rule ( M M

<7).

II. G. Metos, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Thomas A. DufTin, Salt Lake City, for
respondent.
W A D E , Chief Justice.
Bish's Sheet Metal Company as plaintiff commenced this suit in the city court
wherein the court granted a judgment of
"No Cause of Action" in favor of the defendant, Chris J. Luras, who is the appellant herein. This judgment w a s entered
on February 4, 1960. On February 3, a
notice of appeal was mailed to appellant's
attorney. The notice of appeal was filed
on February 26, 1960. On retrial of the
case in the district court judgment was
given in favor of Bish's Sheet Metal Company, who is the respondent herein.
The sole ground of appeal to this court
is that the district court lacked jurisdiction to try the case because the appeal was
taken prematurely.
Rule 7 3 ( h ) , U.R.C.P. relating to appeals
from a city court to the district court provides that:

3. Constitutional Law <£=>3I6
Judgment C=>386(l)

"An appeal may be taken to the district court from a final judgment rendered in a city or justice court w ithin
one month after notice of the entry of
such judgment, or within such shorter
time as may be provided by law. The
party appealing shall within the time
allowed, serve upon the adverse party
a notice of appeal and file the same.

If a showing were made that district
court reversed the decision of the city

Rule 7 3 ( / ) , U.R.C.P. provides that:

C
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mere!) could have subjected respondent to
a dismissal of the appeal or other action in
the discretion of the court.

"Failure of the appellant to take any
of the s furthcr steps to secure the reMCW of the case, except filing notice
of appeal and dt positing
the
fees
thcreior. shall not aftect the \ a h d i t y
of the appeal but is ground for such
action as the district court d t c m s appropriate, which maj include dismissal
of the appeal. * * * "
l.Emphasis
ours.)
[1,2]

It is apparent that Rule 7 3 ( h ) ,

U.R.C.P. pro\ides that an appeal must be
taken within one month after

notice

of

entry of judgment and the appellant must
s e i v e and file a notice of appeal upon the
adverse part}.

It is equally clear by the

pro\isions of Rule 73{l),

U R C.P. that the

filing of the notice of the appeal and the
pa>mcnt of the fees therefor within the
time

allowed

are

the only

requirements

necessary for the court to have jurisdiction.

All other

steps, therefore,

cannot

affect the jurisdiction but any failure to
follow the dictates of the rules makes the
appellant subject to appropriate action by
the court which may even include dismissal of the appeal.

Since the notice of ap-

peal was filed after the entry of the judg-

[ 3 ] Defendant does not claim relief
from this judgment ^r ^ r l n* n n t i ^ _ © T
knowledge of such appeal or the proceedi n g thereunder in the district court
The
record indicates that he had notice of
such appeal and presented his defense
and was accorded due process of law in
that respect.
If a showing were made
that, regardless of the safeguards against
such an occurrence the district court
reversed the decision of the city court
on an appeal without due notice or knowledge of such appeal or the proceedings
in the district court to the party w h o
prevailed in the city court, such a showing
would establish a lack of due process of
law. The aggrieved party under such a
showing would be entitled to relief from
the jiicfgmcnt of "the district court under
subdivision ('/) oi RmCWJb)
Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure even after trTe~~ex pi ration ot three months becau^rTehrf^fforh a
judgment on account of a lack of due
process of l a w i s not expressly provided for
by such rule. 1
Affirmed.

Costs to

respondent.

ment the fact that the s e n ice w a s made
before such entry did not affect the jurisdiction of the court to try the case.
I. Rule 00(b). U.RC.P. " M e n k e s ; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect: Newly
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On
motion and upon such terms ns are just,
the court nin.v in the furtherance of justice relieve n party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inndtrrteuce. surprise, or
excusable neglect: (2) nevvlj discovered
evidence which b.v due diligmic could not
have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 50(h); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic). niiMeprescntation,
or other misconduct of an ndvetse pnrtv;
(4) when, for anj cause, the summons in
nn action has not been personally served
upon the defendant ns required by Uule
4(c) and the defendant his failed to appear in said nction: (To the judgment
is void, (G) the judgment has bioii satisfied, releitM'd, or disih.irgtd or o prior

It

HENRIOD, MCDONOUGH, CALLIST E R and C R O C K E T T , JJ., concur.
judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment
should hove prospective application; or
(7) atut other reason justifymo
tchef
ftom the opctatwn
of the
judgment.
The motion *hall be made within a
leasonabtc
time and for reason* (J)%
(2), (J), or (4), not mote than S months
after the judgment, oidcrt or proceeding uas entned ot taken
A motion under this subdivision (b) docs not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the
power of n court to entertain an independent action to relieve o party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to fcet
aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from n indgnient shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or hy
nn independect action."
(Emphasis
outs )

INTERSTATE EXCAVATING v. AGLA DEVELOPMENT

Utah

369

Cite as, Utah, 611 P.2d 369

the trial court found that there was no basis
to allow the defendant credit toward the
joint venture of the No. 15848 sums paid as
salary to his wife and son by the Ernest
Wilson Company, Inc.; and made a finding
as to the amount contributed to the joint
venture by Ernest I. Wilson.
The defendant contends that if there
were a joint venture it was between the
plaintiff and Archdome, Inc., a corporation.
The defendant however contends that he
should be entitled to the full proceeds of the
sale of the home and land and that the
plaintiff would not be entitled to any of the
proceeds, even though his financial contribution to the project is without any substantial dispute.
[4] It would be unconscionable for the
plaintiff Score to lose his entire contribution while the defendant retained the entire
proceeds of the home sale.
This Court in the case of Bassett v. Baker, Utah, 530 P.2d 1 (1974), defined a joint
venture:
A joint venture is an agreement between
two or more persons ordinarily but not
necessarily limited to a single transaction
for the purpose of making a profit. The
requirements and relationship are not exactly defined, but certain elements are
essential. The parties must combine
their property, money, effects, skill, labor
and knowledge. As a general rule, there
must be a community of interest in the
performance of the common purpose, a
joint proprietary interest in the subject
matter, a mutual right to control, a right
to share in the profits and unless there is
an agreement to the contrary, a duty to
share in any losses which may have been
sustained.

[6] Inasmuch as the findings and judgment are supported by substantial credible
evidence, under the standard rule of review
they are entitled to the presumptions of
verity. See Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah
2d 389,360 P.2d 176(1961).
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff (respondent).
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and
STEWART, JJ., concur.
HALL, J., concurs in result.
WILKINS, J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein.
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INTERSTATE EXCAVATING, INC.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

\jyJ

S

v.
AGLA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant
No. 16599.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 18, ,1980.

Defendant appealed from an order of.
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, \
Jay E. Banks, J., which denied its motion to
j
set aside a default judgment rendered
/
against it for labor and materials furnished /
in construction of water and sewer system. /
The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held I
that where defendant did not receive notice \
of trial date from its attorney after attor- /
[5] The existence of the joint venture ney's withdrawal from case and where, I
must depend upon the facts of each case upon receipt of notice of default judgment, \
and formality of agreement is less impor- defendant immediately contacted its J
tant than the acts and conduct of the par- present counsel who thereafter proceeded /
ties, and the facts that exist in each partic- with diligence to attack default judgment, I
ular case. Holtz v. United Plumbing and interests of justice would be best served by )
(
Heating Co., 49 Cai.2d 501, 319 P.2d 617 setting aside the default judgment.
Judgment vacated; case remanded.
(1957).

d

^
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Hall, J., filed dissenting opinion in
which Wilkins, J., joined.
1. Judgment <s»92
In appropriate circumstances, default
judgments are justified, and when so justified, they are invulnerable to attack.
2. Judgment e=>92
Default judgments are not favored in
the law, especially where a party had timely
responded with challenging pleadings.
3. Judgment $=»135
Policy of the law is to accord litigants
the opportunity for a hearing on the merits
where that can be done without serious
injustice to other party; thus, courts are
generally indulgent toward setting aside of
default judgments where there is reasonable justification or excuse for defendant's
failure to appear and where timely application is made to set it aside. Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 60(b).
4. Judgment e=»135
Where there is doubt about whether a
default judgment should be set aside, jloubi
should be resolved in favor of doing so.
Rules of Civil ProcedureTKuTe 60(b).
5. Judgment e=* 143(11), 153(1)
^
Where defendant did not receive notice
of trial date from its ftttojrn^y^ftgr_attorney*s withdrawal from case and where,
upon receipt of notice of default judgment,
defendant
immediately
contacted
its
present counsel who thereafter proceeded
with diligence to attack default judgment,
interests of justice would be best served by
silting aside the~Hefault judgment. Eules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(5)7"
Robert M. McRae of McRae & DeLand,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
E. H, Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.
1. The rule provides that:
On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party
from a final judgment
for the following reasons: (1)

CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
Defendant Agla Development Corporation seeks reversal of the denial of its motion based on Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P.,1 to set
aside a default judgment for $46,101.70 for
labor and materials furnished in construction of water and sewer systems in two
subdivisions being developed by the defendant in Salt Lake County.
Plaintiff commenced this action on May
16, 1978. Defendant responded with an answer asserting defenses and a counterclaim.
A pre-trial conference was held on April 16,
1979, at which defendant's counsel Robert
J. Haws requested that he be allowed to
withdraw, which request the court granted.
The court instructed plaintiff's attorney to
notify the defendant to obtain new counsel,
and that the case was set for trial on May 7,
1979. Plaintiff's attorney certifies that on
April 16, such a notice was mailed to the
defendant addressed to its business office.
The record also contains a ce^rtincaJtiojQ_J)y
defendant's then counsel, Mr. Haws, thaJLhe
mailed to the defendant a notice of the trial
setting and of his withdrawal as counsel.
As opposed to the foregoing stands the de-1
fendant's denial that it ever received such
notices.
*
On the day set for trial, May 7, no one
appeared on defendant's behalf; and upon
the basis~of evidence presented, judgment
was entered for the plaintiff and defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.
In support of its motion to set aside the
default judgment, defendant avers that its
former counsel, Mr. Haws, withdrew from a
number of cases simultaneously; and that
the notice to appoint counsel may have been
misplaced with numerous papers served
upon the defendant's office by mail. And
further, that it had no notice of the trial
until it received the notice of the judgment
daTeaMay 14, whereupon it immediately
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect
. The motion shall be made
not more than three months after
the judgment . . . was entered
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ppp Lar t.pd p n ^ n t counsel, who proceeded
with djljpnpcp to prepare the motion (he
avers it was prepared within four days) and
f j H the pmtinn M f t l ^ J ^ J i l l <%* H.£l5J

receiving the notice of judgment!.

injustice to the other party. 3 To that end,
the courts are generally indulgent toward
the setting aside of default judgments
where there is a reasonable justification or
excuse^for the d e l e n d a n l s I allure to appear, ^mj where timely application is made
to set it aside. 4 Consistent with the objective just stated, where there is doubt about
whether a default should be set aside, thel
doubt should be resolved in favor of doing'
so, to the end that each party may have an
opportunity to present his side of the controversy and that there be a resolution in
accordance with law and justice.*

[1,2] It is not to be questioned that in
appropriate circumstances default judgments are justified; and when they are,
they are invulnerable to attack. However,
tliey are not favored in the law, especially
where a party has timely responded with
challenging pleadings. When that has been
done some caution should be observed to see
t h a t the party is not taken advantage of.
Speaking generally about such problems, it
[5] Application of the principles disis to be kept in mind that access to the cussed herein to the instant situation leads
courts for the protection of rights and the us to the conclusion that the interests of
settlement of disputes is one of the most justice will best be served by setting aside
important factors in the maintenance of a the default judgment and giving the parties
peaceable and well-ordered society.2 This that opportunity. In that connection, we
of course must be done in obedience to call attention to th~e prefatory clausePof
rules; and it is to be conceded that there is Rule 60(b) that "upon such J e r m s as are.
a possibility that the defendant was less just"~a~party may be relieved from a judgthan diligent in attending to its interest in m e n t . This authorizes the tria1~CQurl to
this lawsuit. But no evidence was taken, impose such terms as may be just as a
nor did the court make any findings other "C6nditibTiT6~seTting"aside the default.
than the order denying defendant's motion.
The default judgment is vacated and the
This is admittedly a perplexing case.
case remanded for further proceedings. _No_
From the standpoint of the plaintiff and its costs awarded.
counsel, they appear to have proceeded
without any impropriety, including appearMAUGHAN and STEWART, JJ., concur.
ing on the trial date and presenting their
HALL, Justice (dissenting):
case. Defendant counters with the averI respectfully dissent.
ments that it received no such notice. Supportive of the defendant's position, are the
In denying defendant's motion to vacate
facts that the justification for its default judgment, the trial court was applying a
rests upon the assertion of service of notice specific statutory standard: "On motion
by ordinary mail; and that immediately and upon such terms as are just, the court
upon learning of the judgment, it proceeded may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
diligently with efforts to set it aside and party or his legal representative from a
contest the issues on the merits.
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
[3,4] The uniformally
acknowledged following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertpolicy of the law is to accord litigants the ence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
. ." l It is not to be questioned that
opportunity for a hearing on the merits,
where that can be done without serious the policy ol the law favors the granting of
2. Sec. 11, Art. I. Utah Constitution.
3. Locke v Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d
1111 (1955).
4. See Xlayhew v Standard Gilsomte Company,
14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P 2d 951 (1962).

5. See Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 90 P. 897
(1907); Locke v. Peterson, footnote 3 above.
1. Rule 6(Kb)(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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with in binding o\er petitioner from cit\
to district court though magistrate did not
sum the order
Affirmed

1. Criminal Law C=>273 1(4)

There was no violation of petitioners
rights when he pleaded guilt\ alter ha\mg
been counseled In his attorney and after
a plenarv explanation of his rights and
possible consequences of his plea In the trial
court
2. Criminal Law C=>240

Statute was sufficient^ complied with
in binding o\er petitioner from citv to district court though magistiatc did not si^u
the order V C \ 19-3, 77-1^-19
3 Criminal Law <C=>244

was in Molation of Title 77-15-19, Utah
Code \nnotated 1953, because the magis
trate did not sign the order is resohed in
State \ Laris, 78 Utah 183 2 P 2d 2-H
(1931), and that Title 77-15-19, U C A
1953 relating to transternng the transcript
to the district eourt was not followed, was
attended with such unsatisfactorv and specu l a t e testimonv that the trial court most
eertainl} was not in error in resohing this
issue against the appellant
\\ e conclude that the principles enun
ciated in the recent case ot Brad\ \ United
States, 397 U S 742, 90 S Ct 1463, 2'^
L Ed 2d 747 (1970) are dispositive of the
claim here under the facts reflected in the
record
C\LLISTER
C I , and E L L E T T ,
CROCKETT and T U C K F T T , II , concur

Where contention that statutorv procedures were not followed in transferring
transcript from cit\ to district court was
attended with unsatisfacton and speculative testimony, there was no error in resolvmg i^sue against petitioner
UC A 19:\
77-15-19.
29 Utah 2el 156
Raymond STEWART, Plaintiff
and Respondent,

Lewis Banks, Jr , pro se
Vernon B Romnev, -\tt\ Gen, Da\id S
\ oung, Asst \tt\ Gen , Salt Lake Cit\ for
defendant and respondent
HEXRIOD, Justice
\ppeal from the denial of a petition for
writ of habeas corpus
\ffirmed
[1] Banks, with the aid of counsel,
whose competcnev no one questioned, pleaded guilt} to a forger) charge after anothei
charge was dropped, after having been
counseled b> his attorney and after a plen a n explanation of his rights and the possible consequences of his plea In, the trial
ludge
The reeoid no \\a\ re fleets his claim
that he did not voluntanh and intelligent!}
enter his plea
[2,3] His ur^ence th.it the binding o\er
process from the eit\ to the district court

e

v.
John L. SULLIVAN and Richard Monk
Alien, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 12958.

Supieine Couit of Utah
Feb 7>, 1973

\ctions were brought b} automobile
passenger against host d n \ e r and d r n c r
of other vehicle for personal injuries
From a judgment of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake Count}, Stewart M Hanson, J , dismissing actions without prejudice, the defendants appealed
The Supreme Court, Tuckett, ]., held that where
automobile passenger filed separate actions
against host driver and d r n e r of other
automobjle and host served written interrogatories on passenger who neglected
to answer same after which on motion of

STEWART v. SULLIVAN
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other driver the two cases were consoliand thcreatur complaint was disUUi\
"•^TTrTd tor failure of passenger mterrogarT7T^ oi host although he had answered
• tl ^taTnialK^" similar inter rogatories sub1,} other dnver, under circumMlilUM |
ITTnces Court did not abuse its discre.„>n setting aside its former order and
dttermimng that the action should be disTM - e d without prejudice
\f firmed.
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tion against Richard Monk Allen, the driver of the automobile which collided with
the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a
passenger.
On September 24, 1970, the defendant
John L. Sullivan served written interrogatories upon the plaintiff which the plaintiff neglected to answer. At a later date
Sullivan moved for an order compelling
answers to the interrogatories, which motion was granted by the court and an order
entered requiring answers within 15 days
after service of the order upon the plaintiff.

Where automobile passenger filed sepUpon motion of the defendant Allen, the
arate actions against host driver and driver
two
cases were ordered consolidated. On
,,f other automobile for personal injuries
insing out of accident and host served CMarch 4, 19/£)the motions were made to
written interrogatories on passenger who
dismiss the plaintiffs complaint on the
basis of his failure to answer the interroganeglected to answer same after which on
tories. The motions were granted and an
motion oi other driver the two cases were
order
entered dismissing the complaint of
consolidated and thereafter complaint was
the
plaintiff.
dismissed for failure of passenger interrogatories of host although passenger had
answered substantially similar interrogatories submitted b\ other driver, under circumstances, court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside its former order and
determining that the action should be dismissed without prejudice. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 6 0 ( b H " ^ *
"""""

[ack L Schoenhals, Salt Lake City, for
Sullivan.
David K Winder, of Strong & Hanni,
Milt Lake City, for Allen
David E West, Armstrong, Rawhngs,
West & Schaerrer, Salt Lake City, for
Mew art.
TUCKETT, Justice:
*Ihe plaintiff filed these proceedings in
•he court below seeking to recover for
pergonal injuries suffered in an automobile
undent. At the outset plaintiff filed a
k a r a t e action against the defendant John
r
Sullivan, the driver of an automobile
'i which the plaintiff was riding as a pas-uiger, claiming that Sullivan was guilty
oi wilful misconduct, and also filed an ac-

On May 14, 1971, the attorney who had
represented the plaintiff was suspended
from the practice of law. Plaintiff retained other counsel, and on March 162
1972, counsel for the plaintiff appeared ex
parte and obtained an order from the court,
which amended its prior order and recited
that the complaint was dismissed without
prejudice. On April 13, 1972, after a hearing and all parties being represented, the
court set aside the amended order of dismissal and reinstated its first order. Subsequently the court granted a further hearing upon the matter, after which the court
entered a new order which recited that "the
court having reviewed all of the files and
records and affidavits herein" found there
was sufficient grounds to reheve plaintiff from final judgment of dismissal and
ordered that the plaintiff's complaint as
against both defendants be dismissed without prejudice
It is from the latter order
that the defendants appeal
There are certain circumstances in connection with this matter that should be
noted. The plaintiff had answered interrogatones submitted to him bv the defendant Richard Monk Allen prior to the con-
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lohdation of the two cases The interrogatories and the answers are substantialK the
same as those submitted to the plaintiff b\
the defendant Sullnan. AJter the consolidation of the cases that information
was available to all parties
\t the time
the first order of dismissal was entered it
appears that the court and counsel for the
defendant Allen were of the impression
that the order made was a dismissal without prejudice. In a telephone comersation between counsel for the defendant Allen and counsel for the plaintiff, Allen's
counsel informed counsel for the plaintiff
that the dismissal was without prejudice
The plaintiff had no knowledge of the dismissal and subsequent motions made in respect thereto. It was not until se\eral
months after his counsel became incapacitated to represent him and the plaintiff had
I J Mat hew \. standard GiKomte Co., 14
•s Ttah 2d 52. 37l> P.2d ftol : Warren v
Dixon Ranch Co., 123 I tali 41G. 2GO I\

emplo\ed othe
had transpired

counsel he learned what

In view of the ab 'e recited circumstance^ and the fact that there was no disposition of the case on the merits, we are
of the opinion that the court below did not
abuse its discretion in its determination
that the action should be dismissed without
prejudice
The proMSions of Rule 60(b)
(7) are sufficient!) broad to permit tht
court to set aside its former order which
appeared to have been entered upon an
erroneous assumption and to enter a new
order based upon the record before if1 j
The decision of the court below is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs.
C \ L L 1 S T E R , C J , and HEXRIOD,
E L L E T T and CROCKETT, JJ , concur
2d 741 : Costello \. I mted States. 3T>
1'S. 265. si SCt. .'34. ".> L.Ld2d .V>1:
Madden \ Perr>, 7 O r . 204 F 2d 1GJ).
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Carol WORKMAN, Class
Representative. Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
NAGLE CONSTRUCTION, INC., Artistic
Homes, Inc., Imperial Excavation. Inc..
Gary Nagle, Lamar Nagle, Michael Nagle. Cindy Raleigh, Marilyn Nagle, and
Francis Ford, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 890388-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 30, 1990.

Appeal was taken from order of the
District Court, Salt Lake County, David S.
Young, J., denying motion to set aside
judgment in action brought by State under
Consumer Sales Practices Act. The Court
of Appeals. Dean E. Conder, Senior District
Judge, held that: (1) prevailing party's failure to notify opponents of entry of judgment did not make judgment ineffective,
and (2) judgment entered in favor of State
in class action brought on behalf of condominium homeowners under Consumer Sales
Practices Act was void, absent evidence
that members of class consisting of condominium owners were notified that action
had been brought.

Proc, Rules 58A(d), M(b)(5-7); Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 77(d), 28 U.S.C.A.
3. Judgment <S=>386(1)
Motion for relief from judgment, which
was filed by losing party within one month
after she learned that judgment had been
'entered and which alleged that judgment
was void, was timely under rule providing
for relief from judgment, although it was
not filed _wi thin three month's of iudgmentJs.
entry. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b), (b)(l-7).
4. Judgment <S=>17(1)
Judgment entered in favor of State in
class action brought on behalf of condominium homeowners under Consumer Sales
Practices Act was void, absent evidence
that members of class consisting of condominium owners were notified that action
had been brought. U.C.A.1953, 13-1117(l)(c). (2), 13-11-20(1), (l)(a-e); U.S.C.A.
Const.Amends. f>, 14; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
23(a, b).
5. Constitutional Law <S=>309(1.5)
Parties <3=>35.43, 35.51
Notice to absent members of plaintiff
class, and opportunity for them to disassociate themselves from class, are critical
requirements for maintenance of class action, requirements founded in federally
guaranteed right of absent class members
to due process of law. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 14.

Reversed and remanded.
Bench, J., filed opinion concurring in
result.

1. Judgment <s=>276
Prevailing party's failure to notify opponents of entry of judgment did not make
judgment ineffective.
Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 58A(d).
2. Judgment <S=3276
While noncompliance with rules requiring prevailing party to notify opponent of
entry of judgment does not bring about
automatic invalidity of entry of judgment,
it is weighty fact when determining timeliness of later challenges to judgment. Judicial Administration Rule 4-504; Rules Civ.

6. Judgment <3=>844
Judgment entered on behalf of State in
class action brought on behalf of condominium owners, which was rendered void when
members of class were not notified that
action was pending, could not be vitalized
by assigning judgment to class representative. U.C.A.1953, 13-ll-17(l)(c), (2), 1311-20(1), (l)(c); U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5,
14.
7. Judgment <s=>34t)
Generally, district court has some discretion in ruling on motion to set aside
judgment; however, if judgment is determined to be void, court has no discretion,
and judgment must be set aside. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b).
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Bryan W. Cannon (Argued), Salt Lake
City, for defendants and appellants.
Paul N. Cotro-Manes (Argued), Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before BENCH, GARFF and
CONDER,1 JJ.
OPINION
CONDER, Judge:
Defendant Marilyn Nagle appeals the
district court's denial of her motion to set
aside a judgment. We reverse.
The Utah Division of Consumer Protection (Division) initiated this action as plaintiff under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, title 13, chapter 11 of the Utah
Code, alleging misconduct by the defendants in the sale of certain condominiums.
This action alleges only civil, not criminal
claims, and the Division acted on behalf of
what it alleged was a class consisting of
the buyers of the condominiums in question. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Division, which
later assigned the judgment to Carol Workman as representative of the alleged class.
Although the condominium buyers are said
to be a class in the complaint and in the
judgment, formal notice has not been given
to the members of a class.

when the court determined that the defendants' newly substituted counsel had not
been properly notified of the pretrial conference or of the ensuing evidentiary hearing.
In November of 1987, the Division moved
for summary judgment, seeking essentially
the same disposition as it had earlier obtained after the defendants failed to appear
at the pretrial conference. The defendants
failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment, and the court granted it. The
State assigned the resulting summary
judgment to Carol Workman "as class representative," and she was substituted as
the sole plaintiff in this action.
After proceedings were begun to enforce
the judgment, Marilyn Nagle, with new
counsel, moved in February 1989 to set the
judgment aside pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P.
60(b). The district court denied her motion.
and she has appealed that denial.
Notice of En t ry of Ju dgm e n t

[1] Before determining whether the
judgment should be set aside, we consider
whether it was validly entered in the first
place.2 Marilyn Nagle argues that the
judgment was not validly entered because
the prevailing party did not notify her of it
After the pleadings, some early motions, pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 58A(d), which
and discovery, the district court scheduled reads:
a pretrial conference, which was held on
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgJune 17, 1986. The defendants failed to
ment
The prevailing party shall
appear at that conference, and the court
promptly give notice of the signing or
consequently held them liable according to
entry of judgment to all other parties
the complaint and scheduled an evidentiary
and shall file proof of service of such
hearing to determine the amount of the
notice with the clerk of the court. Howdamages. The defendants did not appear
ever,
the time for filing a notice of apat the evidentiary hearing, and judgment
peal
is
not affected by the notice requirewas entered against them. . The findings
ment
of
this provision.
and conclusions of this 198G judgment refer
to this case as a class action. However, In addition, former Rule 4.5 of the Rules of
the 1986 judgment was later set aside Practice of the District and Circuit Courts.
1. Dean E. Condor, Senior District Judge, sitting
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1990).
2.

A judgment that has not been validly entered
is not effective as a judgment, see W'isden v. Citv
of Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985); Yusky v.

Chief Consolidated Mining Co., 65 Utah 269, 236
P. 452 (1925), and, since it intrinsically lacks
force, there is no point in setting it aside. How
ever, a seemingly effective, but nevertheless in
valid judgment is potentially misleading and
should be stricken.

WORKMAN v. NAGLE CONST.. INC.

Utah 751

Cite as 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990)
3

in effect when this judgment was entered,
contained a similarly worded requirement
that the prevailing party notify ail other
parties that the judgment had been entered.
Workman, the current plaintiff in this
case, concedes that neither she nor the
Division complied with Rule 58A(d) or Rule
4.5. However, that noncompliance does not
invalidate the judgment. Utah R.Civ.P.
58A(c) provides that "[a] judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all
purposes, except the creation of a lien on
real property, when the same is signed and
filed as hereinabove provided." Thus, in
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Sohm, 755
P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 1988), the failure to
give notice of the judgment did not preclude the effectiveness of the judgment,
but rather, under the circumstances, was
harmless error. Notice to the parties of
the entry of the judgment was therefore
not a prerequisite to its effectiveness.4

This conclusion is consistent with the
case law under the comparable federal
rule. Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that the clerk of
the court notify the parties of the entry of
a judgment. Although in federal procedure it is thus the clerk, rather than the
prevailing party, who bears the responsibility to give notice of the judgment, the
purpose and intended effect of the Utah
and the federal rules are the same, namely,
notice that a judgment has been entered.
Federal courts generally hold that the losing party's lack of the required notice does
not preclude effectiveness of the judgment.
See, e.g.. Tucker v. Commonwealth Land
Title Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 1054 (11th Cir.
3. The judgment in this case was rendered in
January of 1988. On October 30, 1988, Rule 4.5
was superseded by Rule 4-504 of the Code of
Judicial Administration.
4.

Utah cases decided under the now repealed
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District
and Circuit Courts held that the time for filing
notice of appeal did not begin to run until
notice of the judgment had been given. Calfo v.
D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697. (Utah 1986);
Wayne Garjf Constr. Co. r. Richards, 706 P.2d
1(^5 (Utah 1985); Larsen v. Larsen, 674 P 2d
116, 117 (1983); Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d
50. 52 (Utah 1980). The newly revised Utah
R.Ci\.P. 58A(d) in effect overrules these cases,

1986); Spika r. Village of Lombard. 763
F.2d 282 (7th Cir.1985), cert denied 474
U.S. 1056, 106 S.Ct. 793, 88 L.Ed.2d 771
(1986); Orshan r. Macchiarola, 105 F.R.D.
534 (D.N.Y.19S5).
[2] However, the failure to give the required notice is an important factor in determining the timeliness of post-judgment
proceedings, where an exact time limit is
not prescribed. If a party has had notice
of the judgment but has nevertheless remained idle in attacking it in the court of
rendition or in appealing it, that lack of
diligence is a strong reason not to disturb
the judgment. On the other hand, if a
losing party has remained ignorant of a
judgment in part because the prevailing
party has not complied with Rule 58A(d),
the resulting delay is more reasonable for
purposes of Rule 60(b)(5)-(7). Rule 58A(d)
and the current Rule 4-504 are therefore
not inert desiderata. Rather, while noncompliance with those rules does not bring
about the automatic invalidity of an entered judgment, it is a weighty factor in
determining the timeliness of later challenges to the judgment under Utah
R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) through (7). A judgment
is thus presumed effective when entered
until a timely and meritorious challenge is
brought against it, and Rules 58A(d) and
4-504 weigh heavily in determining whether a challenge under Rule 60(b)(5H7) is
timely.
We therefore hold that the judgment in
this case has taken effect, despite the plaintiffs failure to send the required notice of
the judgment. We proceed to consider the
timeliness of the motion to set the judgand provides that the time for filing notice of
appeal begins to run when the judgment is entered, and entry does not include a requirement
that counsel give notice of the judgment. See
Graco Fishing <£ Rental Tools. Inc. v. Iron wood
Exploration, Inc., 735 P.2d b2 (Utah 1987) (remanding to consider extension of time for appeal despite failure to ser\e notice of judgment).
With regard to post-trial motions in the trial
court, rather than to notices of appeal, the rule
has long been that the time for filing begins to
run even though notice of the judgment was not
given. In re Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 241
P.2d 462 (1952).
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merit aside, bearing in mind the fact that
Marilyn Nagle did not receive the required
notice of the judgment.
Timeliness

under Rule 60(b)

[3] Before considering the merits of the
motion to set aside, we consider the time
requirements for such a motion prescribed
by Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) enumerates seven grounds for setting aside judgments, and requires that a motion relying
on grounds (1) through (4) be made within
three months of the entry of the judgment
None of grounds (1) through (4) has been
asserted in this case, perhaps in view of the
fact that Marilyn Nagle's motion to set the
judgment aside was made over a vear after
tKJM u dgi^rir~was_£atered.
A rule J30(b) motion relyJng_ox), grounds
[oM^rough (7) need_noL.^necessarily . be
made within three months, but it must be
made "within a reasonable time":
[A] party seeking relief under [Fed.R.
Civ.P. 60(b)(5) through (7)] must do so
within a "reasonable time." The bases
for relief are that the judgment is void,
or that ifTias beelT^atisfied. or that the
law on which the court rehed has been
reversed, or, if an injunctive decree is
involved, that a change in circumstances
makes it no longer equitable to enforce
it. The derision not to limit the right to
raise these challenges within a set time
period reflects th<^seriousnesfr of the issues. . . . In generalTTITltfeF'all of these
\ provisions the moving party need show
|,only that she acted diligently once tjie^
I ]basis for relief became available, (and
that the delay in seeking relief did not
cause undue hardship to the opposing
party.
J. Friedenthal, M. Kane &. A. Miller, Civil
Procedure § 12.6 at 574 (1985); sec also 11
5. The State was the onl\ named plaintiff in this
case until after the judgment was awaidcd, even
though the State was not a member of the
"plaintiff class. The State was therefore an
inappropriate choice as class representative,
since it had no claims of its own that were
tvpical of the class. Sec Utah Code Ann
§ 13-11-20(1 )(c) (19S6) While the State mav,
in its own name, press the claims of those who
complain to it under section 13-11-17( 1 )U), sec
Slate ex rel Div. of Consumer Protection r. CiAh

C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Pructici dProcedure § 2866 (1973).
In this case, Marilyn Nagle moved to M-t
aside the judgment within about a month
alter learning that the judgment had been
entered, and her ignorance of the judgment
until that time was due in part to a lack of
notice that the plaintiff was required u»
provide, furthermore, her "motion asserts-.
with good reason as noted below, that tinjudgment is void, and the seriousness of
that basis for setting aside the judgment
also weighs heavily in favor of holding her
timing to be reasonable. Marilyn Nagle"^
motion was therefore timely under rule
60(b). and, since no other procedural irregularities appear on the threshold, we proceed
to the merits of her motion and consider
whether the district coui i eired in refusing
to set the judgment aside.
Procedural

Defects in Class

Action

[4] This case was apparently intended
to be a class action. The Division is enabled by Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-17 (19Mi)
to bring essentially two types of actions for
the recovery of damages compensating consumers, an action under section 13-1117(1 )(c) "to recover . . . on behalf of consumers who complained to the [Division]
within a reasonable time after it instituted
proceedings under this chapter," or a class
action under section 13-11-17(2) on behalf
of consumers. There is no mention in this
case that any of the allegedly aggrieved
consumers complained to the Division within a reasonable time; rather, the complaint
contains allegations supporting the formation of a class, and the judgment that Marilyn Nagle seeks to set aside is based on the
express conclusion that a class properly
exists and is to receive the judgment '
However, although this case was pursued
Corp., 760 P.2d 310 (Uah 1988). section 13-1120(1) requiies that a class action be brought in
the name of a representative member or mem
bers of the class. The enoneous designation of
the State as class representative is another de
feet in this class action, besides lack ot notice t<»
the class. However, we do not re.st oui decision
on the choice of class repiescntativc, but iathu
rneieK note the problem for the distuct u»titi s
consideration on remand.
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as a class action, there is no indication in
the record that the members of the class
were notified that this would-be class action was pending, that they had a right to
pursue their claims independently of the
class, and that a judgment rendered in the
class action would conclusively adjudicate
their claims against the defendants.
[5] Notice to absent members of a
plaintiff class, and an opportunity for them
to disassociate themselves from the class,
are critical requirements for maintenance
of a class action, requirements founded in
the federally guaranteed right of the absent class members to due process of law.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 811-12, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 2974-75,
W L.Ed.2d 628 (1985); In re Temple, 851
F.2d 1269 (11th Cir.1988); Wehner v. Syntax Corp., 117 F.R.D. 641, 645 (N.D.Cal.
1987). A class action adjudicates the rights
of persons who ordinarily are not actively
involved in the litigation or aware of specific actions taken in it. Because of this fact,
the court assumes some responsibility to
protect the interests of the absent class
members. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 809, 105
S.Ct. at 2973; 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy,
Moore's Federal
Practice fl 23.45[4.-5]
(1987) (characterizing a class action as a
"quasi-administrative proceeding conducted
by the judge"); Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I),
b\ Harv.L.Rev. 356. 398 (1967). The resulting adjudication of the rights of persons
without their active participation, and the
added burden on the court, are justified
only if the prerequisites for a class action
are
met.
See
Utah
Code
Ann.
§ 13-11-20(1 KaHe); Utah R.Civ.P. 23(a)ib).6
6. A class action is not the only.means of organizing, for litigation purposes, a group of claimants whose interests appear to be aligned or
similar. Such a group mav form an association,
a non-profit corporation, or use another means
of organizing private activity. Such private o?
ganizational forms have the advantage of leaving in the claimants' hands the decisions conf i n i n g their relations between themselves,
rather than placing the court in the role of
defining and overseeing those relations in supervising a class.

In this case, nothing in the record indicates that the members of the would-be
class consisting of the condominium owners were notified that this action had been
brought to adjudicate their claims against
the defendants. Workman's counsel represented at oral argument that the condominium owners had actual knowledge of the
litigation in this case and notice to them
would therefore have arguably been a
mere formality. However, there is no evidence in the record to support this representation of counsel. While we have no
particular reason to doubt it, there is nevertheless no sufficient evidentiary basis to
support a finding that the condominium
owners had actual knowledge of this action, as counsel represented." Wre therefore lack the factual predicate for taking
up the issue whether actual knowledge satisfies the right of the class members to
notice. Based on the record before us,
there is no evidence that the condominium
owners knew or were notified of this litigation and its potential effect on their rights
in relation to the defendants.
The requirement that the class in this
case be notified of the class action is founded on the due process rights of the members of the class, who are not active in this
litigation. A judgment is void as against
persons to whom due process has not been
accorded in its rendition. s The judgment in
favor of the state on behalf of this wouldbe class of condominium owners is therefore void.
[6] Since the void judgment was a nullity when rendered, Workman took nothing
when it was assigned to her. Moreover,
even if we assume that corrective action
after rendition could somehow breathe life
into the void judgment, the assignment to
7. See Redd v. Segley, 785 P.2d 1098 (LTtah 1989).
8. Bradford v. Xagie, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988)
(judgment not satisfving the minimum contacts
test o\ the due process clause was void); In re
Center Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440, 1448-50
(9th Cir.1985); Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward
Co., 520 P.2d 1352. 1356-58 (Alaska 1974).
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Workman would create no basis for correcting and salvaging the judgment, because the assignment provides that Workman acts as a representative of the class.
It is clearly a step in the right direction for
a class representative (rather than the
State, which is not a member of the class)
to pursue this class action, but the assignment does not correct the lack of notice to
the members of the class. Thus, the ameliorative action taken after entry does not
vitalize this void judgment.
We respectfully decline to take the approach suggested in the concurring opinion, primarily because it was not considered
by the trial court or the parties, leaving us
without some necessary information. An
appellate court can indeed raise a jurisdictional point sua sponte,9 but not all procedural nonconformities create jurisdictional
defects. Moreover, even if we were to
assume that administrative noncompliance
with section 13-ll-17(2)(a) could affect the
court's jurisdiction, we lack the basis for
determining whether the Division failed to
comply with section 13-1 l-17(2)(a) in this
case. Such a determination would hinge in
part on whether the defendants committed
an act or practice which violated an administrative or case law rule, and we cannot
simply assume, in the absence of argument
and a trial court decision on the issue, that
the defendants did not violate such a rule.
Moreover, the Division is empowered to sue
in its own name, see Utah Code Ann.
9.

Western Capital & Sees., Inc. \. Knudsvig, 768
P.2d 989, 992 (Utah Ct.App.). cert, denied, 779
P.2d 688 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Palmer,
111 P.2d 521 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (appellate jurisdiction).

10. Quinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct.App.
1989); Demetuas v. Tallas, 764 P.2d 628 (Utah
Ct.App. 1988).
11. Generally, the district court has some discretion in ruling on a rule 60(b; motion. However,
if the judgment is determined to be void, the
court has no discretion, and the judgment must
be set aside. Honneiis v. Donovan, 691 P .2d 1. 2
(1st Cir.1982); Jordan v. Gillian. 500 r\2d 701
(6th Cir.1974), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 991, 95 S.Cl.
19Q6, 44 L.Ed.2d 481 (1974); 11 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 at
197 (1973).
12. Nothing in our ruling requires the dismissal
of the claims raised in this case. Rather, on

§ 13-11-17UXC) (1986), as well as on behalf
of a class, and the complaint can be interpreted under notice-pleading rules l<> as
stating a claim for relief to the Division on
behalf of complaining consumers who were
later erroneously certified into a class, notwithstanding the lack of notice to them
[7] In conclusion, Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(5) requires n that a void
judgment be set aside. Marilyn Nagle
moved to do so, and. for the reasons noted
above, the district court erred in denying
her motion. The denial of her motion is
therefore reversed, the judgment is set
aside as void, and this case is remanded for
further proceedings.11'
GARFF, J., concurs.
BENCH, Judge (concurring in result):
I agree that the class judgment awarded
to the Division of Consumer Protection (Division), and later assigned to Workman, is
void, but on different grounds. While the
majority rests its decision upon a procedural defect, with which I do not necessarily
disagree, I believe that under the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act (the Act), no
class action may be maintained in the
present case. Any class judgment would
therefore be void, even if procedurally correct under section 13-11-20 of the Act.
It is clear from the pleadings that the
only cause of action alleged against defenremand, the judgment should be treated as if il
had never been entered, because it is void.
From this point, the district court could, on
motion of a party or sua sponte, proceed to
certify a class pursuant to section 13-11-20. if it
first determines that the Division had authority"
to sue on behalf of a class in this case. Alternatively, the action could be pursued, not by a
class, but by the individual parties in their own
names, see Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19 (1986).
Once the condominium owners have properly
become parties (assuming no further involve
ment by the State), the court and the parties
may proceed to consider the merits.
The decision from which this appeal was tak
en was the denial of a motion by all remaining
defendants to set the judgment aside; however,
only Marilyn Nagle appealed. Our ruling on
appeal therefore applies only to Marilyn Nagle.

Rule 4-506
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Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment added Subdivision <9> and substituted
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"attorney fees" for "attorneys' fees" throughout
the rule.

Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in
civil cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in trial courts of
record except guardians ad litem and court-appointed counsel.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Withdrawal requiring court approval. Consistent with the Rules of
Professional Conduct, an attorney may withdraw as counsel of record only
upon approval of the court when a motion has been filed and the court has not
issued an order on the motion or after a certificate of readiness for trial has
been filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney may not withdraw except
upon motion and order of the court.
(2) Withdrawal not requiring court approval. If an attorney withdraws
under circumstances where court approval is not required, the notice of
withdrawal shall include a statement by the attorney that no motion has been
filed on which the court has not issued an order and that no certificate of
readiness for trial has been filed.
(3) If an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, the withdrawing attorney
must serve written notice of the withdrawal upon the client of the withdrawing
attorney and upon all other parties not in default. A certificate of service must
be filed with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal
shall include a notification of the trial date.
(4) If an attorney withdraws, dies, is suspended from the practice of law, is
disbarred, or is removed from the case by the court, opposing counsel shall
serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented client. The
Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must inform the unrepresented client of
the responsibility to appear in a court or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice
to Appear or Appoint Counsel must be filed with the court. No further
proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days have elapsed from filing of
the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the client of the withdrawing
attorney waives the time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the
court.
(5) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may replace the current counsel of
record by filing and serving a notice of substitution of counsel. Filing a
substitution of counsel enters the appearance of new counsel of record and
effectuates the withdrawal of the attorney being replaced. Where a request lor
a delay of proceedings is not made, substitution of counsel does not require the
approval of the court. Where new counsel requests a delay of proceedings,
substitution of counsel requires the approval of the court as provided in this
rule.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 15,1990; April 15, 1991; Mav 15, 1994; November
1, 1997.)
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1997 amendment rewrote this rule.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Notice to appoint counsel.
Cited.
Notice to appoint counsel
Defendant's failure to give notice to plaintiff

3

of its responsibility to appoint counsel unt
Subdivision (3> before filing its motion to dismiss rendered it improper for the trial cour
dismiss plaintiff's action, notwithstanding l *
inordinate period oi inactivity that prece

Rule 58A
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Oil Shale Corp v Larson 20 Utah
2d 369 438 P 2d 540(1968)
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 22AAm Jur 2d Declarator
Judgments ^ 183 186 203 et *eq
C.J.S. — 26 C J S Declarator. Judgments
*§ 17 18 104 155

A.L.R. — Right to jur> trial in action for
declaratory relief in state court 33 A L R 4th
146

Rule 58A. Entry.
(a) Judgment upon the leidict of a jury Unless the court otherwise directs
and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a jur>
shall be forthwith signed b> the clerk and filed If there is a special verdict or
a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a jurv
pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate judgment which
shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed
(b) Judgment in other cases Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge
and filed with the clerk
(c) When judgment entered, notation in register of actions and judgment
docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes,
except the creation of a hen on real property, when the same is signed and filed
as herein above provided The clerk shall immediatel> make a notation of the
judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment A copy of the signed judgment
shall be promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided in
Rule 5 The time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement
of this provision
(e) Judgment after death of a party If a party dies after a verdict or decision
upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be
rendered thereon
(f) Judgment by confession Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized b> statute, the part\ seeking the same must file with the clerk of the
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the
defendant, to the following effect
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it shall
concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is justly due or
to become due,
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the plaintiff
against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim and that the
sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same,
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs
of entry, if any
(Amended effective September 4, 1985, January 1, 1987, November 1, 1997 )
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend
ment in Subdivision <d> rewrote the first sentence which hid read "The prevailing partv
shall prompt K give notice of the signing or
e n t n of judgment to all other parties and shall
file proof of ser\ ice of such notice w ith the clerk
of the court " and in the second sentence deleted
"However from the beginning and deleted "no
tice before requirement

Compiler's Notes. — The subject matter of
this rule is dealt with in Rules 58 and 79(a)
FRCP
Cross References. — Judgment against
person d\ ing after \ erdict or decision not a hen
on realt\ ^ 78 22 1 1
J u d g r n e n t bv confession authorized * 78 22
g

h
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7 ( utah 1993), Putvin V. Thompson, 878 P2d
it 78 (Utah Ct App 1994), Ron Shepherd Ins v
Qh elds 882 P2d 650 (Utah 1994), Commercial
Inv Corp v Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct

App
Utah
Lube
App

1997), PDQ Lube Ctr, Inc v Huber, 329
Adv Rep 20 (Utah Ct App 1997), PDQ
Ctr, Inc v Huber, 949 P2d 792 (Utah Ct
1997)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. «fur* ^d. — 58 Am Jur 2d New Trial
ns 11 to 14. 29 et seq , 187 to 191
' C.J.S. — 66 C J S New Trial §§ 13 et seq ,
115, 116, 122 to 127
A-L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, m civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
Htatute or rules of court, 3 A L R 3d 1191
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
o r comments by judge as to compromise or
«Pttlement of civil case, 6 A L.R 3d 1457
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
'opposition to motion for new trial in civil
7 A L R 3 d 1000
^Quotient verdicts, 8 A L R 3d 335
Propriety and prejudicial effect of mstructions in cml case as affected by the mariner in
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, H A L R.3d 918.
Propnety and prejudicial effect of reference
bv counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A L R 3d 1101
Absence of judge from courtroom during tnal
of civil case, 25 A L R 3d 637
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attornev as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A L R 3d 126

Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A L R 3d 845
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
c m l case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A L R 4th 1041
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal

38 A L R 4th

1170

j

^ w a j y e r a g fe d
Qn {
sUte
b
. / . .Q A T D ... _._
cml trial, 48 A L R.4th 747
Court reporters death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
n e w trial
> 57 A L R 4th 1049
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
alone new tnal
granted on ground of made<l uac y of damages — modern cases, 5 A L.R 5th
®7^
After-acquired evidence of employee's misconduct as barring or limiting recovery in action for wrongful discharge, 34 A L R 5th 699
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of
seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 A L R Fed 541
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions
under Federal Employers' Liability Act t45
USCS §§ 5 1 e t s e q ) — modern cases, 97 A L R
Fed 189

Rule 60. Relief from j u d g m e n t or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any as the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new t n a l
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extnnsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons
(
1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding
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was entered or taken A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action
(Amended effective April 1, 1998 )
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998
amendment eliminates as ground* for a motion
the following '(4) when for a m cause the
summons in an action has not been personalh
served upon the defendant as required by Rule
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action " This basis for a motion is not found
in the federal rule The committee concluded
the clause was ambiguous and possibly in con

flict with rules permitting s e n ice by means
other than personal service
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment deleted the former fourth ground for a
motion in Subdivision (b), as described in the
Advisory Committee Note above and renumbered the grounds accordingly
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60 F R C P

NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Am other reason justifying relief
— Default judgment
— Impossibility of compliance with order
— Incompetent counsel
— Lack of due process
—Merits of case
— Mistake or inadvertence
— Mutual mistake
—Real party in interest
— Refund of fine after dismissal
Appeals
Clerical mistakes
— Computation of damages
— Correction after appeal
—Date of judgment
Void judgment
—Estate record
— Inherent power of courts
—Intent of court and parties
—Judicial error distinguished
—Order prepared by counsel
—Predating of new trial motion
Court's discretion
Default judgment
EfFect of set aside judgment
—Admissions
Form of motion
Fraud
— Burden of proof
— Divorce action
Independent action
—Constitutionality of taxes
— Divorce decree
— Fraud or duress
— Motion distinguished
Invalid summons
—Amendment without notice
Inequity of prospective application
Jurisdiction
Mistake inadvertence surprise or excusable
neglect
— Default judgment
Illness
Inconvenience
Meritorious
Merits of claim
Negligence of attorney

No claim for relief
— Delayed motion for new trial
—Factual error
—Failure to file cost bill
—Failure to file notice of appeal
— Nonreceipt of notice and findings
—Trial courts discretion
— Unemplo\ment compensation appeal
—Workmen s compensation appeal
New lv discovered e\ idence
— Burden of proof
— Discretion not abused
Procedure
— Notice to parties
Res judicata
Reversal of judgment
— Invalidation of sale
Satisfaction, release or discharge
—Accord and satisfaction
—Discharging representative of estate from
further demand
—Erroneously included damages
—Prospective application of judgment
Timeliness of motion
— Confused mental condition of party
— Dismissal for lack of prosecution
—Fraud
—Invalid service
—Judicial error
—Jurisdiction
— Mistake inadvertence and neglect
— Newly discovered evidence
— Order entered upon erroneous assumption
— "Reasonable time
— Reconsideration of previouslv denied motion
— Satisfaction
Unauthorized appearance
Void judgment
— Basis
— Lack of jurisdiction
Cited
"Any other reason justifying relief.*
Subdivision lbX7) embodies three require
ments First that the reason be one other than
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6)
second that thet^ason justify relief and third
that the motiondha made within a reasonable
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7 ( l jtah 1993), Putvin V. Vbompson, 878 P2d
i | 7 8 ( U t a h C t App 1994), Ron Shepherd Ins v
Shields 882 P2d 650 (Utah 1994), Commercial
Inv Corp v Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct.

Rule 60

App 1997), PDQ Lube Ctr, Inc v Huber, 329
Utah Adv Rep 20 (Utah Ct App 1997), PDQ
Lube Ctr , Inc v Huber, 949 P2d 792 (Utah Ct
App 1997)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
fan. JUT. 2d. — 58 Am Jur 2d New Trial
ix 11 to 14. 29 et seq , 187 to 191
C # J # S . — 66 C J.S New Trial §§ 13 et 8eq.,
115, 1H>» 122 to 127
A-L.R- — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, m civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
Mla tute or rules of court, 3 A L R 3 d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
o r comments by judge as to compromise or
settlement of civil case, 6 A L.R.3d 1457
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
i n opposition to motion for new trial in civil
7 A L R 3d 1000
^Quotient verdicts, 8 A L R 3d 335
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, H A L R.3d 918.
Propnety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former tnal
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A L R 3d 1101
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial
of civil case 25 A L R 3d 637
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attornev as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A L R 3d 126

Amendment, after expiration of time for fil
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made m due time, 69 A L.R 3d 845
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
c m l case where jury has been waived or not
demanded bv parties, 9 A L R 4th 1041
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
, 38 A L R 4th 1170
,
,
bindinc on later state
c l v 7 t L l 48 A T R 4th 747
CI
™ t n a 1 ' 4 8 * ,f\l
. . w
Court
reporters death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new
^
5 7 A L R 4th 1049
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
alone new tnal
granted on ground of madeq u a c v o f damages — modern cases, 5 A L R 5th
**75
After-acquired evidence of employee's misconduct as barring or limiting recovery in action for wrongful discharge, 34 A L.R 5th 699
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of
seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness—
modern cases, 96 A L R Fed 541
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions
under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45
USCS §§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A L R
Fed 189

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new tnal
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons
(
1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months a f t o r *hp nidpmpnt order, or Droceeding
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was entered or taken A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action
(Amended effective April 1, 1998 )
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion
the following "(4) when, for a m cause the
summons in an action has not been personalh
served upon the defendant as required bv Rule
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action " This basis for a motion is not found
in the federal rule The committee concluded
the clause was ambiguous and possibly in con

fiict with rules permitting service by means
other than personal ser\ice
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment deleted the former fourth ground for a
motion in Subdivision (b), as described in the
Advisory Committee Note above, and renumbered the grounds accordinglv
C o m p i l e r ' s Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60 F R C P

NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Anv other reason justifying relief
— Default judgment
— Impossibility of compliance with order
— Incompetent counsel
— Lack of due process
— Merits of case
— Mistake or inadvertence
— Mutual mistake
— Real part> in interest
— Refund of fine after dismissal
Appeals
Clerical mistakes
—Computation of damages
— Correction after appeal
—Date of judgment
Void judgment
— Estate record
— Inherent power of courts
— Intent of court and parties
—Judicial error distinguished
— Order prepared by counsel
—Predating of new trial motion
Court's discretion
Default judgment
Effect of set aside judgment
—Admissions
Form of motion
Fraud
— Burden of proof
— Divorce action
Independent action
— Constitutionality of taxes
— Divorce decree
— Fraud or duress
— Motion distinguished
Invalid summons
—Amendment without notice
Inequity of prospective application
Jurisdiction
Mistake inadvertence surprise or excusable
neglect
— Default judgment
Illness
Inconvenience
——Meritorious
Merits of claim
—~-Negligence of attorney

No claim for relief
—Delaved motion for new trial
—Factual error
—Failure to file cost bill
—Failure to file notice of appeal
— Nonreceipt of notice and findings
—Trial courts discretion
— Unemployment compensation appeal
— Workmen's compensation appeal
Nevvlv discovered evidence
— Burden of proof
— Discretion not abused
Procedure
—Notice to parties
Res judicata
Reversal of judgment
— Invalidation of sale
Satisfaction, release or discharge
—Accord and satisfaction
—Discharging representative of estate from
further demand
—Erroneously included damages
—Prospective application of judgment
Timeliness of motion
— Confused mental condition of party
— Dismissal for lack of prosecution
— Fraud
— Invalid service
—Judicial error
—Jurisdiction
—Mistake inadvertence and neglect
— Newlv discovered evidence
— Order entered upon erroneous assumption
—"Reasonable time "
— Reconsideration of previously denied motion
— Satisfaction
Unauthorized appearance
Void judgment
— Basis
— Lack of jurisdiction
Cited
"Any other reason justifying relief."
Subdivision lbX7) embodies three require
ments First that the reason be one other than
those listed in Subdivisions (1* through (6),
second that tb«4fl*ason justify relief, and third
that the motiondba made within a reasonable

78-51-35

JUDICIAL CODE

(2) upon the order of the court or judge thereof upon the
application of the client, after notice to the attorney.

566

78-51-41. C o m p e n s a t i o n — Lien.
The compensation of an attorney and counselor for services
is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not
restrained by law. From the commencement of an action, or
the service of an answer containing a counterclaim or at the
time that the attorney and client enter into a written or oral
employment agreement, the attorney who is so employed has
a lien upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim, which
attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the client's favor and to the proceeds thereof in
whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be affected by
any settlement between the parties before or after judgment.
Any written employment agreement shall contain a statement
that the attorney has a lien upon the client's cause of action or
counterclaim.
1989

1953

78-51-35. Effect — N o t i c e of c h a n g e .
When an attorney is changed as provided in Section 78-5134, written notice of the change and of the substitution of a
new attorney or of the appearance of the party in person must
be given to the adverse party; until then he must recognize the
former attorney.
1995
78-51-36. N o t i c e to a p p o i n t s u c c e s s o r .
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases
to act as such, a party to an action or proceeding for whom he
was acting as attorney must, before any further proceedings
are had against him be required by the adverse party, by
written notice, to appoint another attorney or to appear in
person.
1953

78-51-42. R e f u s i n g t o p a y o v e r m o n e y — Penalty.
An attorney and counselor who receives money or property
of his client in the course of his professional business and who
refuses to pay or deliver the same to the person entitled
thereto within a reasonable time after demand is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
1953

78-51-37.

C o n v i c t i o n of c r i m e — J u d g m e n t of disbarm e n t — D u t y of c l e r k s of court.
Upon conviction of an attorney and counselor of felony, or
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, the judgment of the
Supreme Court must be that the name of the accused be
stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors of the court,
and that he be precluded from practicing as such attorney or
counselor in all the courts of this state; upon conviction in
other cases, the judgment of the court may be, according to the
gravity of the offense charged, deprivation of the right to
practice as an attorney or counselor in the courts of this state
permanently or for a limited period. The clerk of the court in
which any such conviction is had must within thirty days
thereafter transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of
the record of conviction, which shall be conclusive evidence
thereof.
1953

78-51-43. E x c e p t i o n — D e m a n d for b o n d .
When an attorney and counselor claims to be entitled to a
lien upon money or property of his client in his possession he
is not liable to the penalty of Section 78-51-42, unless he
neglects or refuses to pay or deliver such money or property to
the person entitled thereto upon such person giving a bond
with sufficient surety, to be approved by the clerk of the
district court, conditioned for the payment of the amount of
such attorney's claim when legally established.
19M
78-51-44. E x c e p t i o n o n g i v i n g b o n d .
Nor shall the attorney and counselor be liable as aforesaid,
if he shall give a sufficient bond, to be approved by the clerk of
the district court, conditioned that he will pay or deliver the
whole or any portion of such money or property to the claimant
in the event such claimant shall finally establish his right
thereto.
1959

78-51-38. S u r e t y s h i p — A t t o r n e y forbidden to a s s u m e .
No practicing attorney and counselor shall become a surety
in any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which he is
engaged as attorney.
1953
78-51-39. Certain officials not to p r a c t i c e law.
Sheriffs, clerks of courts and constables, and their deputies,
are prohibited from practicing law or acting as attorneys and
counselors, or from having as a partner an attorney and
counselor or anyone who acts as such.
1953

CHAPTERS 52 TO 55
RESERVED
PART VII

78-51-40.

C o r p o r a t i o n s and a s s o c i a t i o n s f o r b i d d e n t o
practice — Exceptions.
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary association, except such as are organized for benevolent or charitable purposes, or organizations approved by the Supreme
Court and formed for the purpose of assisting persons without
means in the pursuit of civil remedies, to hold itself out to the
public by advertisement or otherwise as being entitled to
practice law or to furnish attorneys or counselors, or to render
legal services or advice of any kind in any action or proceeding,
or to solicit directly or indirectly any claim or demand for the
purpose of bringing action thereon. Any corporation or voluntary association violating any of the provisions of this section
is liable to a fine of not more than $5,000; and every officer,
agent or employee of such corporation or voluntary association
who directly or indirectly engages on behalf of such corporation or voluntary association in any of the acts herein prohibited, or assists such corporation or voluntary association to do
such prohibited acts, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The fact that
such officer, agent or employee is a duly and regularly licensed
attorney at law shall not be held to permit or allow any such
corporation or voluntary association to do the acts prohibited
herein, nor shall such fact be a defense upon the trial of any of
the persons mentioned herein for a violation of the provisions
of this section.
1953

COURT REPORTERS AND STENOGRAPHERS

CHAPTER 56
GENERAL PROVISIONS [EFFECTIVE UNTIL
JANUARY 1, 1998]
Section
78-56-1.
78-56-1.1.
78-56-2.
78-56-3.

78-56-4.
78-56-5.
78-56-6.
78-56-7.

K

Repealed.
Record of district court proceedings [Effectj
until January 1, 1998].
Duties of shorthand reporter [Repealed efij
tive January 1, 1998J.
,<f|
Compensation — Traveling expenses —ijjj
quency of payment [Effective until Janu]
1, 1998J.
Compensation — Transcripts and copie^J
fective until January 1, 1998].
Assistant reporters — Duties — Compensajjj
[Repealed effective January 1, 1998].
Certified transcripts prima facie correct [Effl
tive until January 1, 1998].
Oath — Bond — Action on bond [Repeal
effective January 1, 1998].
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AMENDMENT I

A M E N D M E N T VIII

[Religious and political f r e e d o m . ]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.

[Bail — P u n i s h m e n t . ]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

A M E N D M E N T II
[Right to b e a r arms.]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
m a n n e r to be prescribed by law.
A M E N D M E N T IV
[Unreasonable searches a n d seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due proc e s s of l a w a n d j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n c l a u s e s . ]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without j u s t compensation.
A M E N D M E N T VI
[ R i g h t s of a c c u s e d . ]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the n a t u r e and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
A M E N D M E N T VII
[Trial b y j u r y i n civil c a s e s . ]
In Suits a t common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, t h a n according
to the rules of the common law.

i

A M E N D M E N T DC
[Rights r e t a i n e d by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall,
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.
AMENDMENT X
[Powers reserved to states o r people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.
A M E N D M E N T XI
[ S u i t s a g a i n s t s t a t e s — R e s t r i c t i o n of j u d i c i a l power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be con
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
A M E N D M E N T XII
[ E l e c t i o n of P r e s i d e n t a n d V i c e - P r e s i d e n t . ]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of,
the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
person having the greatest number of votes for President,
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have
such majority, then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President,
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states,
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President,
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of VicePresident of the United States.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT XIII
ration
lL(t (Slavery prohibited.)
RL (Power to enforce amendment.)
[flection 1. [8lavery prohibited.)
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
nishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
ivicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
bject to their jurisdiction.

E

See. 2. [ P o w e r t o e n f o r c e a m e n d m e n t . ]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
u
n
AMENDMENT XIV
*•
Section
1. (Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.)
2. (Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. (Disqualification to hold office.]
4. (Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.)
5. (Power to enforce amendment.)
Section 1. ( C i t i z e n s h i p — D u e p r o c e s s of l a w — Equal
protection.)
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
lubject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
nake or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
mmunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2.

[ R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s — P o w e r to r e d u c e a p p o i n t ment.)
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.)
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability.
Sec. 4.

[Public debt n o t to b e q u e s t i o n e d — D e b t s of
t h e C o n f e d e r a c y a n d c l a i m s n o t to b e paid.)
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions

\fY\

Amend. XVIII, 8 1

and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void.
S e c . 5. [ P o w e r t o e n f o r c e a m e n d m e n t . )
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. I Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify.)
2. |Power to enforce amendment.)
S e c t i o n 1. (Right of c i t i z e n s to v o t e >— R a c e or c o l o r
not to disqualify.)
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
S e c . 2. [ P o w e r to e n f o r c e a m e n d m e n t . )
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XVI
[ I n c o m e tax.)
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.
AMENDMENT XVII
[Election of senators.)
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to a fleet the
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid
as part of the Constitution.
AMENDMENT XVIII
(REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT
XXI, SECTION l.|
Section
1. (National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.)
2. (Concurrent power to enforce amendment.)
3. (Time limit for adoption.)
S e c t i o n 1. [National p r o h i b i t i o n — I n t o x i c a t i n g liquors.)
After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof

Section
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
27. [Fundamental rights.]
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I. Declaration of Rights
II. State Boundaries
III. Ordinance
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage
V. Distribution of Powers
VI. Legislative Department
VII. Executive Department
VIII. Judicial Department
DC. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
X. Education
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns
XII. Corporations
XIII. Revenue and Taxation
XIV. Public Debt
XV. Militia
XVI. Labor
XVII. Water Rights
XVIII. Forestry
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions
XX. Public Lands
XXI. Salaries
XXII. Miscellaneous
XXIII. Amendment and Revision
XXIV. Schedule

S e c t i o n 1. [Inherent a n d i n a l i e n a b l e rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right.
1896
S e c . 2. [All political p o w e r i n h e r e n t in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require.
1896
S e c . 3. [Utah i n s e p a r a b l e from the U n i o n . ]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the
supreme law of the land.
1896
S e c . 4.

PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.1
2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote or
hold office.]
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.]
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
10. [Trial by jury.]
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
12. [Rights of accused persons.]
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
21. [Slavery forbidden.]
22. [Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
25. [Rights retained by people.]

[Religious liberty — N o property qualification
to v o t e or hold office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution.
1896
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety requires it.
1896
Sec. 6. [Right to b e a r arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms.
1984 (2nd s.s.)
Sec. 7. [Due p r o c e s s of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is
substantial evidence to support the charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to
support the new felony charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is
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